If by "BAAADDDD" you mean "stupid," then yeah, they've been digging themselves deeper for about 9-10 months now. I believe there's a relevant quote from
Tropic Thunder to describe their decision-making processes of late:
I'm going to slightly alter the phrasing, because we don't have enough public evidence to say anyone specific was responsible.
Why don't you buy that a NATO country could have been responsible? Or to phrase it differently: on the list of potential suspects. Motive, means, and opportunity all seem to be there.
I'm going to bookmark the relevant section I mentioned earlier (starting at the 39:44 mark), then summarize for the "tl;dr" crowd. As noted previously, this was posted on September 4, about three weeks before Nord Stream was sabotaged:
Summary: Europe was slow out of the gate in sanctioning Russian energy imports, but by May/June that started to change - technology exports to the Russian energy sector and tanker oil imports were cut, and the stage was set for a larger divestment from Russian energy imports in late 2022/early 2023 timeframe. The fairly immediate Russian response was to throttle back gas deliveries and inflict economic stress on Europe; Poland had been buying Russian gas to this point but was cut off entirely, while Nord Stream 1 deliveries to Germany were cut to 20% of capacity and periodically subjected to extended shutdowns for "maintenance difficulties." This shot natural gas prices up - 2x to 4x depending on what one considers to be the baseline (pre or post COVID) - right as Europe was stockpiling gas for winter. Russia thus got windfall gas revenues while Europe was subjected to increasing costs; however, it seems to have backfired (much as the whole "going to war to push NATO away" deal backfired). Europe basically went looking for other options and was two months ahead of schedule in filling up gas storage; in particular other European nations backfilled Poland's gas cutoff (notably this included Germany, so Poland was probably the indirect recipient of some of that Nord Stream 1 gas delivered before August).
The kicker is at 47:35, and I'm going to quote directly here:
"Now at the time of recording, Nord Stream 1 is due to resume service at 20% capacity relatively soon. To be honest, I'm not sure it's going to turn back on, and if it does turn back on, I'm not sure it won't pretty much immediately turn back off again. I think the Russians are basically done supplying Germany and central European nations with gas through Nord Stream 1. If the goal is maximum economic pressure, then the supply needs to decrease to as close to zero as possible, as quickly as possible."
Funny listening to that now. By blowing the lines Russia arguably would have gone one better; markets don't like when oil and gas infrastructure is threatened (hence why the USN sends carrier groups within cannon-shot range of Iran every time someone in the Persian Gulf cuts a loud fart). And they left themselves an out by leaving one of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines intact.
There are some additional potential motives - I can't find the link now, but apparently in August when the Russians were claiming "turbine issues" due to sanctions were causing the Nord Stream 1 shutdown, Siemens (the manufacturer) called BS and there was some speculation Gazprom could face legal action for failure to fulfill deliveries under contract. Pipelines go boom, Gazprom can't be held liable for not delivering (that or they actually had trashed the turbines, in which case Nord Stream 1 was useless in the near term anyway). More importantly, the lines were blown just outside Danish and Swedish territorial waters - within their exclusive economic zones, but not where it could legally have been construed as an attack and in the Danish case, potentially invoking Articles 4 and 5 and thus potentially justifying NATO retaliation. One set of ruptures bracketed a crossing with the SwePol (Sweden-Poland) submerged underwater power cable. It was an implicit threat that the Russians had the sabotage option in the bag and were willing to use it.
Now, take all that, the known Russian capabilities in the field of undersea sabotage, Russia having naval assets based in the Baltic, Russian Baltic Fleet submarines and support ships being reported in the area a few days before the explosions, the fact that the Russians immediately offered up the intact Nord Stream 2 pipeline for use, and oh yeah, the fact that they were willing to invade another country over a perceived threat earlier this year and it's basically resulted in most of Europe and the US ganging up to strangle them economically ... and the rest of the suspects look like they have too little to gain and too much to lose by pulling something like this. Could a NATO member have done this? Possibly, but their motives were already being fulfilled by diplomatic/economic methods and it would be extremely bloody stupid for them to pull a stunt like this - and those countries have to this point generally been playing winning hands pretty cautiously. Russia on the other hand has backed itself into a corner and it's convinced the only way out is to make someone flinch. We're seeing that now where evidently they've bet the farm on destroying Ukranian energy infrastructure in order to force a settlement, after it's become clear they can't acheive their objectives by taking and holding territory.