NTSB opens public docket on Conception fire

[rjack321]

FWIW, the discussion seems to have gone waaaaay off into the weeds (or the kelp) and has delved in minutiae and hair-splitting over the parsing of words. Think big picture because that's what will help you have a firmer grasp not only on what may or may not have happened, but also on what the NTSB may comment on and recommend on October 20.

Ummm the lack of a roving watchman as required while a criminal investigation is open is the weeds?

 

[KevinNM]

OK. Every inspector failed to notice that the bridge/crew quarters had no second means of egress and that they, for many years, used a prohibited trashcan. What else did they miss?

That is was common practice for the entire crew of multiple ships in the fleet to all go to sleep and nobody thought this was wrong? I remember someone here said that when he’d gotten up on the night there was a watch, so it wasn’t commonly know by passengers, but every single captain? WTF? How did the safety culture go so wrong? Without anyone saying anything?

Was it ever reasonable to allow the second means of egress as they did? It’s interesting that the USCG seems fine with that but when the owner decided to put on an external (and obviously safer) exit on the Vision they freaked out. How much of the problems are due to ridiculously over rigid process and bureaucracy that makes it hard to fix safety issues without absurd processes and expenses?

Why are centrally monitored smoke detectors not required? Does the USCG processes deter people from making safety improvements?

 

[Ken Kurtis]

EDITED: I read it wrong. I read/interpreted the comment in the Group Chairman's Factual Report as not requiring neither an anchor watch nor a navigational watch.
Thanks for the correction Frank.
FYI, from the NTSB group Chairman's Factual Report:
4.8.1 (p. 20) - Navigation Watches (last sentence in section) - "There is no requirement in New or Old Subchapter T to maintain a navigation watch while a vessel is at anchor."

 

[Wookie]

FYI, from the NTSB group Chairman's Factual Report:
4.8.1 (p. 20) - Navigation Watches (last sentence in section) - "There is no requirement in New or Old Subchapter T to maintain a navigation watch while a vessel is at anchor."

Of course not, the vessel isn’t navigating, it’s at anchor.

 

[cerich]

FWIW, the discussion seems to have gone waaaaay off into the weeds (or the kelp) and has delved in minutiae and hair-splitting over the parsing of words. Think big picture because that's what will help you have a firmer grasp not only on what may or may not have happened, but also on what the NTSB may comment on and recommend on October 20.

Big picture is easy, an owner and captain that didn't follow the law at freaking all with regard to crew training, safety briefings, and operations. They KILLED 34 people because of it.

Now before some dive industry apologist worried about the spin off on their ability to make money chimes in... let me do something...

I am going to SAY THEIR NAMES

Neal Baltz
Patricia Beitzinger
Raymond Scott Chan
Kendra Chan
Justin Dignam
Berenice Felipe
Tia Salika-Adamic
Steve Salika
Diana Adamic
Lisa Fiedler
Kristy Finstad
Andrew Fritz
Adrian Dahood-Fritz
Dan Garcia
Yulia Krashennaya
Allie Kurtz
Xiang Lin
Charles McIlvain
Marybeth Guiney
Caroline McLaughlin
Kristian Takvam
Kaustubh Nirmal
Sanjeeri Deopujari
Michael Quitasol
Fernisa Sison
Angela Rose Quitasol,
Nicole Storm Quitasol
Evan Michel Quitasol
Sunil Singh Sandhu
Ted Strom
Wei Tan
Vaidehi Williams

 

[cerich]

OK. Every inspector failed to notice that the bridge/crew quarters had no second means of egress and that they, for many years, used a prohibited trashcan. What else did they miss?

That is was common practice for the entire crew of multiple ships in the fleet to all go to sleep and nobody thought this was wrong? I remember someone here said that when he’d gotten up on the night there was a watch, so it wasn’t commonly know by passengers, but every single captain? WTF? How did the safety culture go so wrong? Without anyone saying anything?

Was it ever reasonable to allow the second means of egress as they did? It’s interesting that the USCG seems fine with that but when the owner decided to put on an external (and obviously safer) exit on the Vision they freaked out. How much of the problems are due to ridiculously over rigid process and bureaucracy that makes it hard to fix safety issues without absurd processes and expenses?

Why are centrally monitored smoke detectors not required? Does the USCG processes deter people from making safety improvements?

Take a look at the inspection done on vision after the Conception accident, a living crap ton of violations, on a boat that passed all previous inspections easily.

But, inspections aside, I simply can not get past how they operated the vessel. No safety briefing until after underway, no roving watch, no anchor watch, no crew fire or vessel operation safety, a AOW was the dressed rescue diver??? (come on, that's a joke). Everything points to a crap culture of "just a taxi" with a crew that operated it like a jackarse that buys a tesla sets it on autopilot at 14mph above the speedlimit and relaxes back for a nap with kids and nuns in the backseat

 

[cerich]

Why are centrally monitored smoke detectors not required? Does the USCG processes deter people from making safety improvements?

they are expensive to install in existing grandfathered vessels. the certified units themselves and the retrofitting. In this case the various industry stakeholders have been successful at lobbying so that they aren't forced to upgrade.

 

[cerich]

I am gonna say, the amount of dive industry insiders that came to Scubaboard after this accident and immediately tried to distort facts, obscure the truth, redirect blame and do whatever they thought they could to "protect the industry" need to go take a LONG look at themselves in the mirror.

 

[Wookie]

they are expensive to install in existing grandfathered vessels. the certified units themselves and the retrofitting. In this case the various industry stakeholders have been successful at lobbying so that they aren't forced to upgrade.

We had a centrally monitored unit. It wasn’t certified, and it wasn’t required. What it did do was wake the dead.

And it tied into the CO monitors, the heat detectors in the galley and engineroom, and the general alarm. All wirelessly.

 

[lexvil]

There is a reason investigators like to interview people ASAP and cover and recover things to make sure the story’s follow the path, playing devils advocate, what if the dead crewman were the roving Watch? Or what if that were asserted?