NTSB opens public docket on Conception fire

[cerich]

The NTSB will most definitely be drawing conclusions as to the cause of the accident and also will be issuing safety recommendations.

true. I meant with that report but framed it too broadly.

 

[kelemvor]

15 topic areas, 1677 pages pages

A bit of light reading for the weekend. Holy cow. Hopefully it will come out on Audible soon.

 

[wnissen]

A bit of light reading for the weekend. Holy cow. Hopefully it will come out on Audible soon.

Yes, I am all for geeking out on nonfiction reading (recently read a whole book on a catastrophic 1959 fire at the Negro Boys Industrial School in Arkansas) but is there any postings or news coverage on the salient new information that is no doubt in this collection of documents? I thought I saw a thread with some details last night but perhaps it had to be pulled. Anyone cracked this particular tome yet? 105 page interview with the first deckhand!

Edit: I did read the interview with the owners of the Grape Escape. It's a narrative, pretty easy to follow, except that the husband keeps on interrupting his wife. I didn't know that by the time the dinghy with the Conception's surviving crew arrived, that the Grape Escape was instructed by the Coast Guard to not even raise anchor, let alone go over to the Conception. They describe the flames being "30 feet" high. (Oddly, the title bar of that document lists it as "Airplane Maintenance Manual Nose Leg Removal-Installation". Must be a hiccup in their Content Management System (CMS).)

 

[O-ring]

I've read most of it. I found the Survival Factors Group Factual Report to be a good summary (only 44 pages) of most of it - Document 1 1 - IIC - Conception Details and Bunk Layout Filing Date September 15, 2020 4 page(s) of Image (PDF or TIFF) 0 Photos

 

[KevinNM]

As for egress from the bunk room, there were two. I’ve seen them both.

Yes, But it was noted that the only egress from the bridge/crew quarters was the single staircase. Which is why they all jumped. Apparently that is clearly not allowed by regulations and nobody ever noticed over 40some years.

 

[wnissen]

I've read most of it. I found the Survival Factors Group Factual Report to be a good summary (only 44 pages) of most of it - Document 1 1 - IIC - Conception Details and Bunk Layout Filing Date September 15, 2020 4 page(s) of Image (PDF or TIFF) 0 Photos

Thanks. "The deckhand, a Vision captain, and a former cook who worked for Truth Aquatics for two years stated that the whole crew always slept at night." Not sure I've seen it stated so plainly before.

 

[O-ring]

Yes, But it was noted that the only egress from the bridge/crew quarters was the single staircase. Which is why they all jumped. Apparently that is clearly not allowed by regulations and nobody ever noticed over 40some years.

Yeah, from what I recall that was the only "real" egress. During the fire some jumped and some exited through the wheelhouse wing doors (one on each side) and lowered themselves to the deck.

 

[BRT]

The NTSB may not be drawing conclusions yet.

HOWEVER, I am under no such restrictions and as someone that has spent half my life on and around the sea working on boats, ships, subs and so forth, that has read the NTSB statement of FACTS.

I hope the Captain and the owner of TRUTH spend the rest of their natural lives in jail. I hope they get sued civilly so badly that they have ZERO assets and only own a toothbrush from the prison store.

That should encourage US dive boat operations!

 

[KevinNM]

Based on this, the crew can’t be much blamed for what happened after they were awakened by the fire. But how it got to them being wakened by their boat on fire is a whole different issue.

 

[O-ring]

Based on this, the crew can’t be much blamed for what happened after they were awakened by the fire. But how it got to them being wakened by their boat on fire is a whole different issue.

From what I have read none of the survivors heard any alarms whatsoever other than 1 or 2 of them reported hearing a very, very faint chirp that may have been emanating from the wheelhouse/dash. One of the crew woke up when he heard a noise like a "chair sliding on deck" and then heard a scream (or something like a scream) and then he saw the glow coming from the salon/main deck and roused the others.

Fire Detection: The bunkroom area contained two independent modular smoke detectors, installed in the overhead, on the port and starboard pathways between the bunks. Investigators were informed by the vessel owner that the smoke detectors in the bunkroom were hardwired into the vessel’s electrical system with a 9-volt battery backup. The smoke detectors were not interconnected to other alarms or a centralized system in the wheelhouse. Based on past photos and video, the smoke detectors appeared to be common consumer-type home detectors. The smoke detectors in the bunk room were the only ones installed and required to be on board. Heat detectors were installed in the engine room and galley. The galley detector was not connected to the range hood fan or any damper, and there was no galley fixed fire-extinguishing system. In the engine room, the heat detector, if activated, would initiate the carbon dioxide (CO2) system for the engine room, but none of the other detectors were interconnected. The captain of the Vision, a similar vessel, stated that he could not hear the berthing area and lazarette detectors from the bridge while underway and that one could faintly hear the lazarette detector with just a generator running.

The owner was aware that the berthing area smoke detectors functioned properly less than a month before the accident voyage, when a contractor was soldering on the air conditioning unit, which activated them. The owner told investigators that after the activation, the captain of the Conception told him that he “unplugged” the smoke detectors while the soldering was ongoing and when the work was completed, the smoke detectors were plugged back in, “fresh” batteries were added, and they were tested. There were no requirements related to the testing and inspection of smoke detectors. When asked whether if there was any inspection or testing of the smoke detectors on the Conception, the owner stated the captain was responsible for any testing and inspection.

At the time of the accident, the second galleyhand that awoke the rest of the crew after discovering the fire stated that he did not hear any alarms, nor did he smell smoke from his bunk aft of the wheelhouse. The deckhand, whose bunk was in the wheelhouse, said that he heard a faint alarm when he was awakened. He did not recognize the alarm and described it as “… coming from the dash [in the wheelhouse]… barely a little chirp.” He further noted that when he looked, he did not notice anything flashing on the console in the wheelhouse.