Thanks for all the comments so far. Some great discussion points. The reason I made the OP was that there is often no black and white answer to such questions. Human behaviour is a consequence of the system we operate in and we need to create a system whereby risk is more obvious than it currently is in diving. Furthermore, sometimes the option to dive should not be given. Rather than taking my money and getting me to sign an additional waiver as an OW diver to dive to 30m/100ft, they shouldn't have let me dive. End of. I wasn't 'mature' enough to make that decision with only 9 dives to my name at that point.
In terms of 'I didn't know what I didn't know', while you might not agree with the premise, it is a truism as it is what the research which Dunning-Kruger showed. Those who are incompetent are hit by a double bind - they don't know what they don't know, even worse, they don't they don't know they are incompetent. The irony is at the other end of the scale - those who are 'experts' know far more than they would believe they know and at the same time, they don't understand why those who are incompetent can't see their incompetence. This was the topic of the presentation I gave at
TekDiveUSA16 and part of it was based on the
research paper from Dunning-Kruger. The book 'The Killing Zone' by Craig Paul is worth a read for those who want to explore how General Aviation/FAA addressed the problem of pilots flying into clouds without an instrument rating. The Killing Zone is the experience level (approx 150 hrs) where the majority of GA fatalities occur. Unfortunately the diving community does not collect such useful data.
What is the solution?
The solution is to be more open about the near-misses, incidents and accidents which happen. Not to hide them in small communities. Without a clear understanding of the scale of the problem, it is hard to make risk-based decisions. You will always have those who intend to go beyond the limits (either through innovation or because they are genuinely 'reckless' and don't mind end up dead or seriously injured) but in the majority of cases, those who break rules are doing it for 'valid' reasons. I wrote on this topic for
TDI/SDI recently.
Another part of the solution is to consider something called the 'Fundamental Attribution Error'. Attribution is how psychologists label the reason behind an action. Internal or dispositional attribution is because the behaviour is due to something directly related to the dive e.g. mood, trait, personality, 'being stupid' etc whereas external or situational attribution is because the behaviour is due to the system in which they reside e.g. they may have had an argument that morning and so their mind was elsewhere, their training was incomplete and so executed an action which they thought was correct, they were subject to peer pressure to complete the dive despite not have the experience to do so. So when you see something that didn't go to plan or is unexpected, consider how and why it made sense for that person to do what they did. Most of the time, the reason isn't internal/dispositional it is external/situational. As such, if we don't address the external factors, others will be subject to the same issues.
I go back to the point right at the start, by transferring all responsibility to the diver through waivers doesn't help improve diving safety. This is a system problem which includes manufacturers, agencies, instructors, dive centres/operators AND the divers/students and their families. Having safety-critical knowledge being passed down with very little (if any) assurance that the information is correct doesn't help the consumer. Providing no/very little information to the divers about how decision-making and situational awareness is made up, doesn't help either.