TSA, the Fun Never Ends..

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ReefHound:
What caused the spark? Accidental or deliberate? Short circuit or sabotage?
Old wiring. Actually a common problem that was known for quite some time. If you are looking for a conspiracy, consider asking why Boeing and the FAA still haven't really dealt the the known problem of wiring running through fuel tanks. The problem is when the tank is left empty, as was the case with this flight, because the extra fuel wasn't needed and would only increase the plane's weight. In this case the tank is full of fumes that are highly explosive. It has been recommended for many years that empty tanks should be filled with Nitrogen, but the airlines don't want to do that because it costs money.
 
howarde:
<snip>Again... is this to say that secuirty was BETTER before the TSA? I'm just curious if anyone thinks it was?
<snip>
Nope. I'm not saying it was any better before the TSA....

I'm saying it's not really any better now.

We especially aren't getting any better security in exchange for the increases in inconvenience and time loss.

All the best, James
 
James - I wasn't specifically asking you. But since you replied...

You don't think that the upgrades to security screening, like new equipment, x-ray of checked luggage, etc. Isn't some sort of improvement? Do you (or anyone) think that back "in the old days" that the airlines would have paid for such upgrades? I don't think they would have.

Can anyone (with a straight face) claim that ANY U.S. airport even had an appearance of being secure prior to the newer system? Remember - you didn't even need a boarding pass at many airports to get to the gates.
 
howarde:
<snip>Can anyone (with a straight face) claim that ANY U.S. airport even had an appearance of being secure prior to the newer system? Remember - you didn't even need a boarding pass at many airports to get to the gates.
As I recall, before the TSA, I had to go through the magnetometer and my belongings were x-rayed. This security screening was done by private contractors, paid for by the airlines.

It's just my opinion, but I believe the TSA that replaced this is no better and probabally worse at denying weapons and weapon materials onto aircraft.

For example, like the Newark debacle, 20 out of 22 weapons (guns and bombs!) were allowed when inspectors secretly tested the screeners. And once in a while I'll forget something in my rollaboard...and it's never caught.

For the same relative level of screening protection, at least the lines were way faster, and less onerous, before the TSA arrived. And (nod to Catherine) more polite.

All the best, James
 
fdog:
As I recall, before the TSA, I had to go through the magnetometer and my belongings were x-rayed. This security screening was done by private contractors, paid for by the airlines.

It's just my opinion, but I believe the TSA that replaced this is no better and probabally worse at denying weapons and weapon materials onto aircraft.

For example, like the Newark debacle, 20 out of 22 weapons (guns and bombs!) were allowed when inspectors secretly tested the screeners. And once in a while I'll forget something in my rollaboard...and it's never caught.

For the same relative level of screening protection, at least the lines were way faster, and less onerous, before the TSA arrived. And (nod to Catherine) more polite.

All the best, James
As I mentioned earlier, I agree that having government employees doing the actual screening is not doing us any favors. By the nature of government employment they are very process oriented and there is very little that can be done through civil service structures to make them or their jobs result oriented. Private contractors operating under close government supervision on the other hand can use creative management and pay methods to concentrate more on the results of the job than just going through the steps of the process.

While it certainly matters how many bags are checked through in an hour, I’m really more interested in how many times contraband items make it through – that’s a result that matters.
 
Bill51:
As I mentioned earlier, I agree that having government employees doing the actual screening is not doing us any favors. By the nature of government employment they are very process oriented and there is very little that can be done through civil service structures to make them or their jobs result oriented. Private contractors operating under close government supervision on the other hand can use creative management and pay methods to concentrate more on the results of the job than just going through the steps of the process.

While it certainly matters how many bags are checked through in an hour, I’m really more interested in how many times contraband items make it through – that’s a result that matters.

:yelclap:
 
howarde:
You don't think that the upgrades to security screening, like new equipment, x-ray of checked luggage, etc. Isn't some sort of improvement? Do you (or anyone) think that back "in the old days" that the airlines would have paid for such upgrades? I don't think they would have.

Can anyone (with a straight face) claim that ANY U.S. airport even had an appearance of being secure prior to the newer system? Remember - you didn't even need a boarding pass at many airports to get to the gates.

Airlines didn't have their customer's asking for it. The government didn't see a problem - so they didn't address the airlines. Heck they didn't want to increase the airlines cost of doing business, too many airlines already owed the government too much money.

Now that security is at the top of the list for many customers, you would see the airlines competing for that buck. You wouldn't just be thinking you are secure, you would probably know it. They would undoubtedly make it part of their marketing campaigns as one of their best features besides more leg space. :wink:
 
chepar:
Interesting thread. Coincidentally, I just read the following New York Times article regarding the gel/liquid ban-

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/business/02road.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin


Very good and to the point. Love the Frosty cartoon.

Just in case:

Decorations

By JOE SHARKEY

Published: January 2, 2007

To paraphrase a classic line from Lily Tomlin, I worry that the person who thought up the rules for carrying liquids and gels on airplanes last year is busy thinking up something new this year.

The thought arises partly because of a scene just after Christmas at an airport security checkpoint, where a half-dozen festive snow globes — like the ones with Frosty the Snowman in a liquid-filled glass globe that simulates snowfall when you shake it — were lined up on a counter.

Wasn’t that nice! The Transportation Security Administration had decorated the checkpoint! But as it turned out, Frosty and his co-conspirators had actually been busted — confiscated from passengers’ carry-on bags pursuant to the following notification by the security administration:

“Snow globes, regardless of size of amount of liquid inside, even with documentation, are prohibited in your carry-on.”

Now, I am not sure what exactly constitutes a documented snow globe. But I do know that the snow globe rule has intensified ridicule of airport security, and that cannot be a good thing.

The shift began in August. That’s when an apparent terrorist plot in London to use liquid explosives on airplanes bound for the United States led security officials to proclaim bewildering new regulations.

Banned were all liquids and gels. Then came modifications. Gel-filled bras were O.K. and then so was infant formula, if accompanied by an actual baby. Then it became O.K. to bring on board liquids and gels, provided each was in a container of not more than three ounces, and all containers were neatly displayed in a quart-size zipper-lock bag.

Now, the Homeland Security Department obviously believes that the vaguely outlined August plot was serious enough to justify cracking down on liquids and gels.

“This was, by any measure, the most sophisticated plot against the United States that came near to fruition since Sept. 11,” the Homeland Security secretary, Michael Chertoff, said in a recent speech.

But the plot seems to have been thwarted before the bad guys reached the airport, because of intelligence and police work, not a focus on rummaging through carry-on bags for bottles of shampoo.

“If you look at the London plot, assuming it was a plot, no security measure then in place would have caught it at an airport,” said Bruce Schneier, an authority on security technology and the author of the book “Beyond Fear.”

Metal detectors spot weapons — assuming the screener is not preoccupied with shampoo.

Inherent in the obsession on liquids and gels, Mr. Schneier said, “is the notion that we can stop the bad guys by focusing on tactics, which is moronic. I pick a defense, you see my defense, and then you, the bad guy, decide what to do. That’s a game we can’t win.”

He added, “Screeners are so busy looking for liquids that they’ve missed decoy bombs in tests. We’ve defined success so weirdly. When T.S.A. takes away some frozen tomato sauce from grandmom because it might become a liquid, they think of it as a success. But that’s a failure. It’s a false alarm.”

It is easy to ridicule the security agency’s carry-on procedures, which are continually being revised — partly, Mr. Schneier argues, because of politics. “Did you know they have special rules for monkeys?”

They do. Like dogs, some specially trained monkeys are classified as service animals to assist handicapped people. But you really have to wonder if these sample sentences — from the security administration’s rules for how transportation security officers at walk-through metal detectors should handle monkeys — were written with a straight face:

“When the handler and the monkey go through the W.T.M.D. and the W.T.M.D. alarms, both the handler and the monkey must undergo additional screening.” The rules add that security officers “have been trained not to touch the monkey during the screening process” and that “the inspection process may require that the handler take off the monkey’s diaper as part of the visual inspection.”

Jokes are easy, like Mr. Schneier’s crack on having to remove shoes: “It’s a good thing the shoe bomber wasn’t an underwear bomber.”

But security is deadly serious, and Mr. Schneier and other experts in the field have been saying for years that the best security is smart, diligent intelligence, not confiscating snow globes or lip gels, which he derides as “security theater, not real security.”

He added, “We spent billions on security to make the bad guys make minor modifications in their tactics. Focusing on the tactics only works if you happen to guess correctly.”

E-mail: sharkeyj@nytimes.com
 

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