Rebreather Discussion from Brockville Incident

[Atom]

Instead, NO - the industry keeps it secret that it is since 2003 that they cannot meet the "Functional Safety" requirements when building a rebreather, then change the rebreather standard and remove precisely the Clause (i.e. 5.13.1 of EN14143:2003) which they cannot meet, then they go after a class of divers for whom a rebreather is totally inappropriate... THAT IS WHAT I CALL STUPID!!

Could somebody clear up what that clause implies? What does it ensures? What would need to be modified to pass the requirement? What accidents could be avoided?

 

[Dsix36]

That shows how dangerous rebreathers are. You forget to turn on your O2, and know you have a problem, and don't even make it to your buddy for help.

A rather stupid way to die.

Put in the hands of recreational divers, the ones who do maybe 10 - 20 dives a year, and put their regulators upside down sometimes, and are bound to make silly mistakes same as everybody else - what is the point to hand them a rebreather for a 15 - 30 meter Open Water dive?

Wes Skiles died in 18 meters of water. Had he been on OC, he would still be alive.

All these recreational divers do not need a rebreather - absolutely pointless for them to do 10 - 20 dives a year in 15 - 30 meters of water and assume the added risk (and cost of a rebreather).

If a rebreather cannot be made safe, let us just leave it for those divers and dives where a rebreather actually offers benefits which outweigh its inherent risks.

Instead, NO - the industry keeps it secret that it is since 2003 that they cannot meet the "Functional Safety" requirements when building a rebreather, then change the rebreather standard and remove precisely the Clause (i.e. 5.13.1 of EN14143:2003) which they cannot meet, then they go after a class of divers for whom a rebreather is totally inappropriate... THAT IS WHAT I CALL STUPID!

It risks backfiring on the industry big time (unless some new technology becomes available to reduce what we can all see are the inherent risks of the current generation of rebreathers).

Short-term some people will make money.

Instructors get what $1000 - 1500 per course PLUS 10% on the rebreather they sell (that is what ISC paid back then when I bought my Meg).

Manufacturers get 10k for something which costs very little to produce (and R&D costs are minimal once you remove the Functional Safety requirement).

I think it will backfire though in the medium-term because insurers will eventually stop playing ball because their business model cannot sustain the fatality rates of rebreathers (or insurance premiums for rebreathers will have to go up as rebreathers become a larger % of the diving market).

You are right though, I can't fix stupid!

you completely miss all the points that anyone trys to make with you. or perhaps it is more enjoyable for you to just ignore anything that you do not want to hear?

YOU do NOT know that Wes would still be alive if on OC and neither do I.

The incident that I referenced, the rebreather was perfectly safe and reliable. There is no way to put any blame on anything other than diver error. He was properly trained and had the abilities to manage the situation, but made a few bad decisions that ended up killing him.

This is the incident that really drove home the entire checklist usage for some of us in the area. He did not use a checklist and had not been trained to do so. His students also were not taught of them. This was a valuable lesson to many.

Rebreathers are not safe and they never will be. I accept that and am willing to risk my own life on the belief that my skills will keep me alive. Every individual can make this choice for themselves and they do so every day. It is not your responsibility to try to dictate the terms of the entire industry just to try and force more "dummy proof" stuff.

The sooner that you understand this:

I am right and you are wrong

The sooner we can end this stupid debate!

Better yet, I am done trying to talk any sense into a brick wall. Good Day and Good Luck

 

[gianaameri]

Rebreathers are not safe and they never will be.

Agreed.

 

[daniel f aleman]

Pete, diving is risky enough, why make it deliberately more risky? If one needs to use a CCR, so be it-- but then you've crossed over to doing more than recreational tech.

I dived with Wes, and Steve Berman in Florida; dived with Parker Turner and Sheck in Mexico. I've been to four funerals of those who died when using CCR (with still unaccounted for Pathology in each case)-- I'm sure to attend more.

Good luck to you.

 

[Superlyte27]

Daniel:

to answer your question, "why make it more risky"...

For the type of diving I do, I think it's less risky. My last dive was at EN at 287' with a 192 minute run time. I didn't need air breaks. I didn't risk switching to the wrong bottle. I had an abundance of gas. And I had 5 completely independant/redundant gas sources. My task loading was considerably less than it would be on OC. I was considerably warmer than I would be on OC. It's just an easier and more enjoyable dive on a rebreather.

Look, CCR & SCR diving is not for everyone. I have friends who are blithering idiots. I have friends who have to shake the cockroaches out of their gear every week before they dive. I have friends who still forget to analyze their mix.

If you are going to be those kind of divers, there's a very strong chance you'll earn a darwin award. I don't believe everyone should have a rebreather. But I do believe that if you are diligent, and you follow that check list every single time, and you don't get complacent just because the last 100 hours were uneventful, I truly believe with all my heart that you get to live. If I didn't, I wouldn't be diving one.

If I die because my CCR burst into a ball of fire at 300' killing everyone around me including all the fish, by all means, use this thread to make your point. If I die because of pilot error, or a missed check, or diving without O2 turned on, or diving with known bad cells, or diving with a known failure in the CCR (these things I list are the causes of virtually every death) call me a dumbass and tell my family and friends, "I told him so".

---------- Post added July 7th, 2013 at 05:51 PM ----------

Pete, diving is risky enough, why make it deliberately more risky? If one needs to use a CCR, so be it-- but then you've crossed over to doing more than recreational tech.

I dived with Wes, and Steve Berman in Florida; dived with Parker Turner and Sheck in Mexico. I've been to four funerals of those who died when using CCR (with still unaccounted for Pathology in each case)-- I'm sure to attend more.

Good luck to you.

Would Parker still be alive if he was on CCR?
Bwuhahaha... CHECK MATE!

 

[flots am]

Rebreathers are not safe and they never will be.

I can see re-breathers becoming as safe as OC when the electronics can accurately measure all the gas components in the loop, using actual gas-specific sensors, and have failure and flood proof absorbent, and automatic switch-over to an appropriate OC mix when anything fails or gets out of a reasonable range.

It won't be happening any time soon, but I can see it happening "some day". OTOH, by that time, it will probably be easier to simply extract the needed gasses directly from the water.

flots.

 

[gianaameri]

I can see re-breathers becoming as safe as OC when the electronics can accurately measure all the gas components in the loop, using actual gas-specific sensors, and have failure and flood proof absorbent, and automatic switch-over to an appropriate OC mix when anything fails or gets out of a reasonable range.

Still that won't necessarily make a rebreather safe.

What is boils down to is what is the Safety Integrity Level of the overall system (taking into account the Safety Integrity Level of each subsystem) AND taking into account the interaction between the man and machine (that is factoring in the Human Error and design the unit to take into account for that).

The current machines fail miserably in taking into account the Human Factor in the design (and then manufacturers blame the human for the failure).

Current machines can be improved at the design level to reduce the risk of human error (and this won't cost much at all).

Then there is the bigger issue of the Safety Integrity Level of the electronics.

In the current machines available to the general public it is "less than SIL 1" (which means they do not meet the "Functional Safety" standard).

That is what apparently current technology cannot overcome. Manufacturers can't deliver currently machines with a SIL level of at least 1 or above.

We need a new technology where each sub-component and the assembled unit will be at least SIL 1 or above to meet "Functional Safety."

Till then, it is Russian Roulette.

You are just going to fool yourself into believing that if you are diligent and do everything right you will live on rebreather.

If the SIL Level is too low (meaning the Probability of Failure of the machine is too high) - even if you are diligent and do everything right you will eventually die on rebreather.

Of course if you then use galvanic O2 sensors which are older than 18 months as in Wes Skiles unit, you dramatically increase your chances of dying on an already very dangerous machine.

Some people asked what "Functional Safety" or lack thereof means. I posted earlier some references to articles explaining it in relatively simple terms (you'll need to do the reading).

By all means there is benefits to use rebreathers from a logistical standpoint (and cost) on some dives, but there is nothing that cannot be done on OC that you can do on rebreather.

However, it is definitely pointless from any perspective - logistic, cost, and risk - to buy a rebreather today to do any Open Water dive that you can do on air or nitrox with a traditional SCUBA bottle or regulator.

Anybody telling you otherwise just wants your $$$ !

 

[tphelps]

The fact of the matter is the rebreather technology still has a ways to go. This is just like when OC SCUBA first came out, the technology has improved 10 fold since the days of J-valves. I have gotten into many disagreements with divers young and old about rebreathers being "death machines." It's my opinion that rebreather fatalities get a little extra attention because they have that reputation of being dangerous.

We have seen some great new features emerge: CO2 sensors, new scrubber designs, bailout valves (BOVs), automatic diluent valve (ADV), heads up display (HUD), vibrating DSV... all of these have been innovations. There is still a lot we don't know about diving and the technology still has a ways to go. But as someone mentioned, I haven't heard of any accident in which it was purely a unit failure. If you follow your checklists and keep your knowledge fresh/current...rebreathers can transcend your expectations of what diving REALLY is. I cant tell you how many great encounters I've had with marine life purely because we were diving closed circuit. Diving is all about the fun, isn't it?

 

[gianaameri]

I haven't heard of any accident in which it was purely a unit failure.

Let me give you one.

Voyager rebreather, Trieste, 26 July 2010, two dead on the same training dive in shallow water.

The unit had a not entirely proper CE certificate and I reported the matter to the U.K. authorities years before (the authorities did f-all about it).

A good judge after proceedings found against the manufacturer (I suspect the insurer involvement may have made some difference in the case).

You are right though. In the vast majority of cases because of the dynamic of the rebreather incident it will be impossible to directly link the rebreather to the cause of death.

We all die of hypoxia and a bit of hypercapnia and bad gas from the rebreather cannot be detected from an autopsy.

 

[Chris Brown Tech]

I would like to reiterate the question already asked: Why are rebreather folks so defensive?

I dont feel 'defensive' but I am very vocal when I see misinformation being spouted. Some examples:

"The machine is out to kill you"

"Youre already dead, you just dont know it yet"

"You are ten times more likely to die on CCR than on OC"

"A rebreather is less forgiving"

"You shouldnt learn to dive on a CCR - thats crazy!"


Trouble is, people want to know facts in a black and white manner. They (insert anything here) are either safe or not. A is better than B or it isn't. Riding motorcycles is dangerous or it isn't. Which is a safer car, a BMW or a Mercedes? etc etc etc. They try to apply the same to diving.

- You should have xx dives / hours befor you dive a ccr
-you need xyz before you can do abc
-anyone who doesnt configure their kit in this way is a stroke.
-That guy is an accident waiting to happen because of abc or xyz

I would have thought that anyone partaking in diving would clearly see that there are nothing is black and white. The only constants are the laws of physics. There are simply far too many variables in life to say which is more dangerous OC or CCR. It simply depends on the day, the individual, experience, fitness, equipment choice, etc,etc,etc.

However, we do see some patterns in CCR fatalities.

1 - we rarely get enough info to be sure exactly what happened beyond doubt
2 - we rarely find a checklist on the victim or in their gear bag or in their car
3 - we sometimes see a unit modification or evidence of a lack of maintenance
4 - we often find that the individual had medical or dependency issues

So whilst its true to say that you can die on a CCR in circumstances that would unlikely see your demise on OC, conversely you can also have options on a CCR that would surely see you expire had you been on OC

So I would disagree with the gentleman that said I was being naive - far from it. Ive considered all this as much as the next person, probably more so. I have to justify the risk every day as my job (especially in the last 5 years in a busy resort destination) and Id respectfully ask people to consider that those of us who teach CCR's regularly (say over 10 classes per year) are pretty much living, eating and breathing this stuff. We sometimes get info that isnt made public because its personal to the deceased and is therefore confidential. I have a 2 year old and a 5 year old and have adjusted my personal risk level but I havent stopped diving CCR because I just dont see ANY fatalities where I think "****, that could have been me!" Or "OMG, these things are dangerous, It just isnt worth the risk." There is always at least one of the list above. We keep going over this debate on all the forums and I keep asking the same question- just show me one fatality, just the one, any one, where the machine truly killed the diver without any chance of them ever noticing it was coming. Where they didnt **** up somehow and forget their scrubber or overuse it or not replace old cells etc, etc. For a trained CCR diver, these mistakes are the same as rec OC divers making a buoyant ascent and suffering an embolism or running out of air and drowning.

5 years now I have been asking this question and I still havent been provided with one example, either online or offline. I take the point that we often dont get any data and that is a concern, of course. But given the high number of deaths, we would surely see SOME evidence that it was the machines killing us.

---------- Post added July 8th, 2013 at 08:52 AM ----------

No, I do not think the moon landing was staged, but blunders happen all the times.

There was a blunder a long time ago and some Notified Body (i.e. a test house/certification agency) issued a two page certificate where the first page could be interpreted one way, and the second page a different way. This led some manufacturer in error and in good faith to mark and sell products as "EN14143:2003" - but in reality the Notified Body never intended to certify it to "EN14143:2003" because the product did not meet Clause 5.13.1 insofar the product had a "SIL Level of less than 1" (SIL 1 is the minimum level to achieve Functional Safety, with SIL 4 being the highest and safest level of Functional Safety).

That is what the Freedom of Information documents I obtained show. They are available to all who make a Freedom of Information request to the U.K. authorities.

So, lots of these products get sold and people start dropping dead (bear in mind that because of the dynamics of rebreather fatalities it is not possible to establish causation, people pass out and drown and the autopsy can only ascertain the drowning as the cause of death - so in no way I am suggesting the rebreather is the cause of the fatality!!!).

Years later the blunder gets caught, but it is kind of late insofar lots of rebreathers have been sold by now and it has become the de facto standard that these machines can actually be released to the general public despite lacking Functional Safety (i.e. being "less than SIL 1").

The issue is then what to do about the situation (in the meantime more and more people are dropping dead, but these machines make good money for a lot of people and a promising industry has developed).

The solution which is being adopted is to create a new standard which removes precisely the requirement which the machines do not meet, and sell more of these machines to a larger number of users.

It is consumerism and the profit motive is taking precedent over any other consideration.

We have now 289 recorded fatalities across a range of machines which all lack Functional Safety (not for lack of trying hard on the part of manufacturers) because the technology is not there yet (O2 galvanic sensors and cheap electronics in a corrosive environment and the inability of the human to detect bad gas before passing out is not exactly conducive to Functional Safety) and we are putting them in the hands of more recreational divers...

I think what is happening will become a Harvard Business School Case Study.

We can only hope in the meantime that some new technology advancement will come soon and rebreathers can be made safer than they currently are because the greater the adoption rate, the greater will be the number of fatalities (whatever the "cause" may be).

Read the reference documents I posted (post 51) and you will get a better understanding as to why where Human Factors (i.e. human error) is implicated then Functional Safety is key to reduce fatalities.

In the meantime we can collect the stats. and time will tell.

Absolute horse ****.

Even if it were true I would never place my full faith in a standard implemented by the worlds biggest bureaucracy (The EU) by some overpaid and ill informed politicians in Brussels who have implemented yet another standard (because its their job to) where they have appointed their friends and business associates to advise the panel. All of whom have agendas and publish a set or requirements that then have to be looked over by another panel with their own personal interests to take into account.

You have no credibility on any of the main forums because you continue to spout off about 'safety,' claim to be in the know and then refuse to provide any evidence to back up your claims.

Back to my original point - lets see an fatality caused by the machine. Surely the Wes Skiles one isnt being put forward as a credible example?