New Fast-Attack Nuclear Submarines to be Named Arizona and Oklahoma

[HalcyonDaze]

A great read I had was Massey's "Dreadnought". It covers the period of 1850 to August 3rd 1914, and covers the entire evolution of the British and German navies along with other developments by other navies.

It gives great insight on the naval arms race and the foundation for the interwar navies also. Britain was in financial trouble in the early 1900s before the war began, and the treaty took a large burden off the empire and the US. The Japanese just took advantage of it and caught up with the other 2 powers quickly.

As @HalcyonDaze mentioned, when the treaty collapsed in the mid 30s, Japan was ahead in many developments and ships.

Mileage may vary as to how far "ahead" the IJN was. The 60% treaty limit rankled the so-called "Fleet Faction" because Japanese war planning anticipated smashing the US Pacific Fleet and then still having enough combat-capable ships to deal with the Atlantic Fleet. The estimate was that the IJN needed to be at least 70% the size of the combined USN to pull this off. The opposing "Treaty Faction" that included Yamamoto in the interwar years pointed out that the Washington Treaty was more of a limit on the US and UK than Japan. The overall Japanese war plan anticipated a decisive battle that would smash the enemy fleet and force the opponent to sue for peace; it doesn't seem like anyone high up asked how that works when your opponents have 10x or more your war industry and are far enough away that you can't directly attack them.


The IJN knew they could never achieve numerical parity, so the hope was they could build individually more powerful ships to overcome this. While this produced some impressive capabilities, the emphasis on speed and firepower in a lot of designs came with drawbacks. In one particular 1935 incident the IJN's Fourth Fleet sailed into a typhoon and much of the fleet took major structural damage - as they say, the ships were overgunned and underhulled. When Japan pulled out of the naval treaties, it essentially gave the US and UK a free pass to use their full industrial potential (in particular, US shipbuilding was boosted as a means of "economic relief" during the later Depression years). While the Japanese were ahead in areas such as torpedoes and night-fighting, they got surpassed relatively quickly in technology and production. They never came close to matching Allied radar capabilities, their aircraft industry produced some formidable successors to early-war fighters but never in sufficient numbers to replace them, and naval construction only replaced a fraction of their war losses. There was a shocking lack of emphasis on ASW escorts and doctrine which bit them hard once the USN got their torpedoes to actually hit things and go off.

 

[Lostdiver71]

The current defensive systems being developed will make a carrier battle group virtually untouchable from the air. I am not aware of any similar systems that will work against the threat of submarines. Of course they actually have to have the systems turned on and active.

 

[Jared0425]

@HalcyonDaze, I agree with you on that account. I've always been fascinated with the Heavy Crusiers that the Japanese fielded in the war. Although in battle their performance was underwhelming and they never did get that decisive battle with our navy they wanted, they sure gave us a bloody nose in the Guadalcanal campaign (Salvo island specifically).

Although by the end of the war, our Baltimore, Cleveland, and Alaska class cruisers were superior than anything the Japanese fielded. And all three classes I mentioned were either in development or were already in the fleet when the war broke out. The US was never all that far behind in naval developments, and our intelligence networks provided us with information on new warships. Preliminary reports on the Yamato were not all that far off.

The current defensive systems being developed will make a carrier battle group virtually untouchable from the air. I am not aware of any similar systems that will work against the threat of submarines. Of course they actually have to have the systems turned on and active.

I'd be cagey with that statement. With area denial weapons, a carrier is definitely at risk.

 

[Lostdiver71]

I said virtually untouchable, nothing is completely invulnerable! That being said, there is a very good reason that the newest carriers and other surface ships are being built with a huge amount of electrical generation capability and are able to integrate their defenses with not only other ships but also aircraft. Hopefully these systems will be in place before the inevitable war with China starts otherwise the results will not be good for us.

 

[Akimbo]

... once the USN got their torpedoes to actually hit things and go off.

That is an amazing story in itself. Charles "Swede" Momsen played a key role in figuring out how to fix the flaw in the Mark 14 torpedo design. He personally made the dive to recover an unexploded torpedo that was test fired against a cliff in Hawaii. He was the Commander of Submarine Squadrons 2 & 4 at the time but wasn't willing to ask or order anyone else to do such a dangerous job.

Peter Maas' The Terrible Hours: The Greatest Submarine Rescue in History is a great book about Momsen, who was a maverick in many ways. He made huge contributions to submarine rescue and helium oxygen diving development.

 

[HalcyonDaze]

That is an amazing story in itself. Charles "Swede" Momsen played a key role in figuring out how to fix the flaw in the Mark 14 torpedo design. He personally made the dive to recover an unexploded torpedo that was test fired against a cliff in Hawaii. He was the Commander of Submarine Squadrons 2 & 4 at the time but wasn't willing to ask or order anyone else to do such a dangerous job.

Peter Maas' The Terrible Hours: The Greatest Submarine Rescue in History is a great book about Momsen, who was a maverick in many ways. He made huge contributions to submarine rescue and helium oxygen diving development.

I posted a video explanation of the issues with the Mark 14 a ways back in this thread; unfortunately it doesn't mention Momsen's dives off the Kahoolawe cliffs in the rather exhaustive discussion of the design flaws and bureaucratic obstinacy that hobbled the Mark 14 until late 1943.

Also, since WWII submarine operations were discussed:

Somewhere in the Q&A comments for that channel someone mentioned having seen some of correspondence from Admiral Ernest King, the infamously acerbic Chief of Naval Operations during WWII, regarding the Mark 14 issues and Bureau of Ordnance's refusal to admit anything was wrong with the design. I believe one of the quotes was "I've seen better organized monkey-**** fights in a zoo."

 

[lexvil]

Not to delve into what may work today but if anyone wants to see a well designed battleship visit one of the Iowa class ships on display, the Iowa is in the Los Angles harbor (San Pedro) and well worth the visit.

 

[Akimbo]

regarding the Mark 14 issues and Bureau of Ordnance's refusal to admit anything was wrong with the design.

This is the same mentality that explains how the Navy's Mark V deep sea rig and it's pathetic attempt to replace it with a fiberglass version of the same technology, the Mark 12, survived 25 years longer than it should have.

It was so painfully obvious that a form-fitting hat or mask with demand and freeflow capability that moved with the diver's head was superior to the 1830s bucket with with windows approach. I just couldn't comprehend how the great majority of the Navy diving community wouldn't even discuss the modern solutions even when navy saturation divers were using it and hot water suits. They were still using the 109Lb Helium Hat in the early 1980s!

The amount of effort and money wasted on trying to make the Mark 12 work was finally recognized when one of the few Master Divers in the navy that "got it" showed an admiral the obvious limitations over a Kirby Morgan Superlite. That is one of many experiences that convinced me that government agencies should never design anything due to the inherent politics.

IMO, the agency that needs the product should develop performance specs and put it out for competitive bid to private industry for a solution. It doesn't eliminate intrenched bias but it makes it much harder for the evaluation committee to close their eyes to designs that outperform the "old way" of doing things. It is well-know that the Navy cultural bias to the past still exists far more than in the Air Force.

 

[Jared0425]

Somewhere in the Q&A comments for that channel someone mentioned having seen some of correspondence from Admiral Ernest King, the infamously acerbic Chief of Naval Operations during WWII, regarding the Mark 14 issues and Bureau of Ordnance's refusal to admit anything was wrong with the design. I believe one of the quotes was "I've seen better organized monkey-**** fights in a zoo."

What it is your opinion on Admiral King?

 

[formernuke]

Admiral King

2 high ranking titles, cannot be trusted.