Papa Bear, i'm guessing you read this report, it alarmed you and brought up some concerns and questions about something you know little about but have a growing curiosity and hoping to start a discussion you made your post. Perhaps you didn't realize what a hotly debated subject this is and how much it touches nerves. Don't be too descouraged by the responses, just take more care in your wording in the future and you will probably be received with less animosity.
here's my two cent answer:
I would have to agree with the others that the statistic you threw out of a 300% increase is likely meaningless as the total number of rebreathers/divers/ number of hours on each unit/type of dive are not known by DAN or anyone else. The increase of fatalities surely reflects the growing number of units in use and if anything suggests a likely improvement in training and safety of design/build since the number of units in use appears to be expanding much faster than the fatality rate. That said, I do think there is a degree of denial amongst rebreather divers as to just how much added risk they are subjecting themselves to over diving OC. In the two years I have been RB diving, I have watched more components fail than in all my previous 12 years of OC diving put together and I have also made more stupid mistakes. I don't think it's a stretch to say that a system that has more points of failure and more steps of set up to screw up has a higher overall risk associated with it's use. By accepting that there is added risk, we have the best chance to compensate for it with better practices, more training and redundancy in kit configuration.
I have found the quest for definite cause with respect to fatalities to be a surprisingly fruitless endeover because there are so many variables and a huge challenge in gathering meaningful data in accidents that often have no witnesses and all too often leave a very murky trail of evidence. It does not help that manufacturers hold a tight fist to production numbers but it's also understandable that they fear ignorant speculation that can be damaging to their bottom line. These dynamics frustrate us all. none-the-less, any information that can be obtained about fatalities or statistics helps keep us all motivated to hone improvements in our diving practices and is in that way a valuable exercise in the very least.
Is the root cause a matter of training or design?
I believe that the complex nature of rebreathers accounts for much of the increased risk associated with them, even when it is all to often the diver in the end who has made the fatal error. The relationship between training, design and diver practice in terms of cause of fatalities is extremely illusive. many point to obvious faults made by the victims in nearly every case and conclude it's not a matter of design but aptitude, while others champion designs that attempt to compensate for the human tendency to make errors by either employing very simple designs that require more diver engagement or by employing vastly more complex automated systems with alarms and buzzers to help grab the divers attention if something goes awry, others merely suggest that training standards should be more stringent so as to weed out the ill fit.
I believe that there will be a major step forward in this sport when behavior sciences are included in the research toward improved match of human's natural tendencies and design and training standards. Right now it looks a lot to me like engineers are trying to take on the roll of psychologist without having an adequate understanding of the true nature of the beast.
If you want to dig further in this the book Risk by John Adams, UCL Press is well respected. I hear it was one of the things that lead Gordon Smith to build the KISS, a rebreather that has no alarms, and doesn't take responsibility for ppo2. Gordon’s innovation has lead to a burgeoning market in manual rebreathers, for which there are nearly zero fatalities associated.
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