3 Divers lost on the Spiegel Grove
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Missdirected
Contributor
AXL72:
Deep breathe
No need to attack, it is a civil conversation with a lot of analogies. 
PM sent
"
Blueskys4ever
Contributor
I value the opinions of everyone on this forum. I believe that discussion spurs change.
While the details are still emerging, it is clear that some of the information is conflicting. I personally, am waiting to see a more substantive report of the events that led up to this horrific tragedy before I comment further.
I would like to point to a resource for accident investigation that has merit. Almost every accident report that I have studied could be applied to Reasons Model.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Cheese_model
While the details are still emerging, it is clear that some of the information is conflicting. I personally, am waiting to see a more substantive report of the events that led up to this horrific tragedy before I comment further.
I would like to point to a resource for accident investigation that has merit. Almost every accident report that I have studied could be applied to Reasons Model.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Cheese_model
It will be interesting to get the survivors testimoney and find out if they were using mix and what the real dive plan was. So tragic!
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First I am personally taking this pretty hard as we have lost three fellow divers who undoubtedly loved the sport, were extensively trained and undoubted are being missed and mourned by many. My thoughts and prayers go out to them and their families and friends and to the many, many others affected by the recovery efforts and to others who may even be doubting/questioning if they did everything correctly and humanly possible in whatever part they played. I hope they find peace as they heal.
A different thought for the many of you debating the law is another interesting line in the Waiver that I am "assuming" each of these divers had signed (from the operator's webpage) reads:
(I don't think anyone else has brought this up yet?)
12. [FONT=Verdana,Verdana]I affirm that I will not dive in an environment that is beyond my training level and ability. I agree to not enter into or penetrate an overhead environment. This pertains to all wreck diving.
[/FONT]
I know many will immediately discount this BUT SCUBA-DO Inc. does have it in the Waiver. Do they mean it? Do they stress it? Is it not applicable because openings have been cut to allow fairly safe egress at upper level "swim throughs"?
Does everyone sign this and know they aren't going to abide by it anyway before ever splashing? (Honestly I would have probably signed it and proceeded to swim through the milder penetrations as I have in past, although I have not gone out with this operator before.
Again I am truly sorry for this loss of life and my symphathies to the friends and families.
A different thought for the many of you debating the law is another interesting line in the Waiver that I am "assuming" each of these divers had signed (from the operator's webpage) reads:
(I don't think anyone else has brought this up yet?)
12. [FONT=Verdana,Verdana]I affirm that I will not dive in an environment that is beyond my training level and ability. I agree to not enter into or penetrate an overhead environment. This pertains to all wreck diving.
[/FONT]
I know many will immediately discount this BUT SCUBA-DO Inc. does have it in the Waiver. Do they mean it? Do they stress it? Is it not applicable because openings have been cut to allow fairly safe egress at upper level "swim throughs"?
Does everyone sign this and know they aren't going to abide by it anyway before ever splashing? (Honestly I would have probably signed it and proceeded to swim through the milder penetrations as I have in past, although I have not gone out with this operator before.
Again I am truly sorry for this loss of life and my symphathies to the friends and families.
mheaster:
When I dived with Scuba-do - they stressed, "do not penetrate the wreck" - every operator that I have dived the spiegel grove with has said, "do not penetrate the wreck" - what more could they do? You can't force people to do things when they're diving their own dive.
Also as I said earlier... other people have mentioned the "swim throughs"; while inviting, and easy penetrations, they are none the less - penetrations.
Blueskys4ever
Contributor
Swiss Cheese Model
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the Swiss Cheese Model, individual weaknesses are modeled as holes in slices of Swiss cheese. They represent the imperfections in individual safeguards or defenses, which in the real world rarely approach the ideal of being completely proof against failure.
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation is a model used in the risk analysis and risk management of human systems. It likens human systems to multiple slices of Swiss cheese, stacked together, side by side. It was originally propounded by British psychologist James T. Reason in 1990, and has since gained widespread acceptance and use in healthcare, in the aviation safety industry, and in emergency service organizations. It is sometimes called the cumulative act effect.
Reason hypothesizes that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four levels of failure:
Organizational influences
Unsafe supervision
Preconditions for unsafe acts
The unsafe acts themselves
In the Swiss Cheese model, an organization's defenses against failure are modeled as a series of barriers, represented as slices of Swiss cheese. The holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in individual parts of the system, and are continually varying in size and position in all slices. The system as a whole produces failures when all of the holes in each of the slices momentarily align, permitting (in Reason's words) "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a hazard passes through all of the holes in all of the defenses, leading to a failure.
The Swiss Cheese model includes, in the causal sequence of human failures that leads to an accident or an error, both active failures and latent failures. The former concept of active failures encompasses the unsafe acts that can be directly linked to an accident, such as (in the case of aircraft accidents) pilot errors. The latter concept of latent failures is particularly useful in the process of aircraft accident investigation, since it encourages the study of contributory factors in the system that may have lain dormant for a long time (days, weeks, or months) until they finally contributed to the accident. Latent failures span the first three levels of failure in Reason's model. Preconditions for unsafe acts include fatigued air crew or improper communications practices. Unsafe supervision encompasses such things as, for example, two inexperienced pilots being paired together and sent on a flight into known adverse weather at night. Organizational influences encompass such things as reduction in expenditure on pilot training in times of financial austerity.
Somewhat edited by me for brevity.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the Swiss Cheese Model, individual weaknesses are modeled as holes in slices of Swiss cheese. They represent the imperfections in individual safeguards or defenses, which in the real world rarely approach the ideal of being completely proof against failure.
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation is a model used in the risk analysis and risk management of human systems. It likens human systems to multiple slices of Swiss cheese, stacked together, side by side. It was originally propounded by British psychologist James T. Reason in 1990, and has since gained widespread acceptance and use in healthcare, in the aviation safety industry, and in emergency service organizations. It is sometimes called the cumulative act effect.
Reason hypothesizes that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four levels of failure:
Organizational influences
Unsafe supervision
Preconditions for unsafe acts
The unsafe acts themselves
In the Swiss Cheese model, an organization's defenses against failure are modeled as a series of barriers, represented as slices of Swiss cheese. The holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in individual parts of the system, and are continually varying in size and position in all slices. The system as a whole produces failures when all of the holes in each of the slices momentarily align, permitting (in Reason's words) "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a hazard passes through all of the holes in all of the defenses, leading to a failure.
The Swiss Cheese model includes, in the causal sequence of human failures that leads to an accident or an error, both active failures and latent failures. The former concept of active failures encompasses the unsafe acts that can be directly linked to an accident, such as (in the case of aircraft accidents) pilot errors. The latter concept of latent failures is particularly useful in the process of aircraft accident investigation, since it encourages the study of contributory factors in the system that may have lain dormant for a long time (days, weeks, or months) until they finally contributed to the accident. Latent failures span the first three levels of failure in Reason's model. Preconditions for unsafe acts include fatigued air crew or improper communications practices. Unsafe supervision encompasses such things as, for example, two inexperienced pilots being paired together and sent on a flight into known adverse weather at night. Organizational influences encompass such things as reduction in expenditure on pilot training in times of financial austerity.
Somewhat edited by me for brevity.
steelemagnolia6
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This is very sad, and a very good example of what not to do!!! Don't dive without a plan and don't dive without the proper equipment... This is a dangerous lifestyle!!! and Murphy is alive and well and will prove that his law works at any given time...
As to being able to rent doubles or 130's I am sure that there is a dive shop or two in the area that rents the required equipment to make successful penetration dives.
We can all guess and read and re-read the reports from this horrible accident till we are blue in the face and our fingers are numb from clicking our mice.The end result is that three members of the diving community have died and their loved ones are left to face what is left behind by the choices that were made. Maybe someone should have stopped before they splashed and given a thought to not could they do it BUT SHOULD THEY DO IT....
It is clearly not the fault of the dive charter!!! It seems to be a result of improper equipment and poor planning...
My condolences to their family, friends, and dive buddies....
As to being able to rent doubles or 130's I am sure that there is a dive shop or two in the area that rents the required equipment to make successful penetration dives.
We can all guess and read and re-read the reports from this horrible accident till we are blue in the face and our fingers are numb from clicking our mice.The end result is that three members of the diving community have died and their loved ones are left to face what is left behind by the choices that were made. Maybe someone should have stopped before they splashed and given a thought to not could they do it BUT SHOULD THEY DO IT....
It is clearly not the fault of the dive charter!!! It seems to be a result of improper equipment and poor planning...
My condolences to their family, friends, and dive buddies....
Blueskys4ever
Contributor
Murphy's Law is myth. This was 100 percent preventable.
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