Watson Murder Case - Discussion

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What I find even more frightening is the A-G's statement:

"It says Watson's sentence fails to reflect the gravity of his offence, fails to take into account the aspect of general deterrence.."

It does seem a little odd. The general principle is that a court should consider imposing a punishment that will both deter the offender from committing further crimes (specific deterrence) and deter others who may contemplate committing similar offences (general deterrence). General deterrence will be an important relevant consideration where the offence is prevalent in the community either generally, in a particular location, or in a particular part of the community. None of those would seem to be relevant here (particularly, as I have said previously, there must be considerable doubt about whether the elements could properly have been satisfied for manslaughter by criminal negligence).

The classic statement in Australia about the role of deterrence comes from a decision of the NZ Court of Appeal, approved many times over in Australian jurisdictions, which said:

“… one of the main purposes of punishment, … is to protect the public from the commission of such crimes by making it clear to the offender and to other persons with similar impulses that, if they yield to them, they will meet with severe punishment. In all civilised countries, in all ages, that has been the main purpose of punishment, and it still continues so. The fact that punishment does not entirely prevent all similar crimes should not obscure the cogent fact that the fear of severe punishment does, and will, prevent the commission of many that would have been committed if it was thought that the offender could escape without punishment, or with only a light punishment?”

This is hardly a situation where people generally have impulses that they might yield to if the Court does not impose a hefty sentence...indeed, quite the opposite may be true.
 
Quote from Under-exposed: This is hardly a situation where people generally have impulses that they might yield to if the Court does not impose a hefty sentence...indeed, quite the opposite may be true.

Can you clarify your statement above for me please? As a layperson I am really lost now. Is the crime he was charged with: Allowing her to drown or not saving her, which caused her to drown? It is not really clear to me from the judges statements what exactly he WAS guilty of. Seems the essence was that a reasonably prudent person with his experience and training could have done a better job and if he had acted on that experience his wife would still be alive. I guess my question is what is the general deterrence in this case?

So, which impulse are you saying is the opposite?

I am also diving in Cozumel this week. Mind is on vacation. Met a fellow from Alabama today (yes, same state Gabe Watson is from)who dove the Yongala last year. He said the waves on the top were several feet high. Very difficult to gather your composure to begin descent. If you didn't make it to the line to get yourself down, you were swept away. According to him two expert divers had to be retrieved with a zodiac and aborted the dive altogether.

Mary
 
I agree it is not clear precisely what it is that he was guilty of. The sentencing remarks reveal that the trial judge thought he had failed to take certain steps that could have prevented her from drowning, including (this is taken from the sentencing remarks):

“failed to do so in the following respects: you failed to ensure that when the deceased had encountered difficulties she had a supply of oxygen available to her, and, in particular, you failed to share your oxygen supply with her; having released the deceased to recover your face mask and oxygen supply, you did not then take hold of her again or stay with her, or follow her as she sank; you did not attempt at any time to inflate her buoyancy control device or remove the weights which divers often carry to assist them to descend.”

There are pages and pages of this thread where I have described my difficulties with the verdict in this case. But what I meant about the impulses was this: ordinarily one would assume that if you had the experience and training and felt comfortable coming to someone's assistance, then you would do so whether or not there was a legal sanction hanging over you. If you did not feel comfortable so doing (whether because of lack of training, lack of faith in your ability despite having training, or because of adverse conditions, including the state of the diver) then one ought not feel pressured to do so because there may be a criminal sanction hanging over you.

The judge seems to have accepted that he tried to assist but did not do enough, so it is difficult to see how there is any significant deterrence element (whether specific or general) at all.
 
I see the difficulty in this sentencing having to do with the idea of "negligence" as the basis of the manslaughter plea. This is known as involuntary manslaughter in the U.S. The typical case goes like this: someone gets drunk, gets behind the wheel, is temporarily mentally impaired hits someone and causes someone to die.

The only way to apply some kind of mental impairment here would be panic or or bad decision-making. In the underwater world, it is bad decision-making that leads to panic. And panic escalates and often becomes a matter of extremely strong sense of self-preservation. I can't think of any other sport that is situationally similar, making it difficult for non-divers to comprehend.

Watson did not describe his own actions as his own panic, but as Tina's panic. He claims got away from her as she knocked his mask and regulator from his face. Many divers, even the most experienced ones would probably head straight to the surface at this point, but he says he managed to take care of the problem. So he was not so temporarily mentally impaired with panic at this point, as he was able to save himself.

As he described, once he took care of this problem, he saw that Tina was sinking too fast for him to catch her. He described his heroic efforts to swim down after her, but made a conscious decision to leave Tina to go to the surface for help. So now, at this point, after making the right decisions to successfully self-rescue, he is suddenly temporarily mentally impaired enough to not make the right decision for Tina and it becomes negligent manslaughter.

In the vast majority of dive accidents where a diver deliberately leaves their dive buddy, the situation occurs out of their own panic and their own strong sense of self-preservation- or they have to leave the buddy because they are low on air or having their own equipment malfunctions - or perhaps they had some kind of underwater disagreement and split on purpose. None of these is what Watson described.

It's basically saying - well, you could have saved your wife, but you deliberately decided not to and that's why we are punishing you, but the reason why is not under consideration. The law gets so wrapped up in technicalities that it seems to lose common sense. And this just makes no sense to me.
 
I agree it is not clear precisely what it is that he was guilty of. The sentencing remarks reveal that the trial judge thought he had failed to take certain steps that could have prevented her from drowning, including (this is taken from the sentencing remarks):

“failed to do so in the following respects: you failed to ensure that when the deceased had encountered difficulties she had a supply of oxygen available to her, and, in particular, you failed to share your oxygen supply with her; having released the deceased to recover your face mask and oxygen supply, you did not then take hold of her again or stay with her, or follow her as she sank; you did not attempt at any time to inflate her buoyancy control device or remove the weights which divers often carry to assist them to descend.”

There are pages and pages of this thread where I have described my difficulties with the verdict in this case. But what I meant about the impulses was this: ordinarily one would assume that if you had the experience and training and felt comfortable coming to someone's assistance, then you would do so whether or not there was a legal sanction hanging over you. If you did not feel comfortable so doing (whether because of lack of training, lack of faith in your ability despite having training, or because of adverse conditions, including the state of the diver) then one ought not feel pressured to do so because there may be a criminal sanction hanging over you.

The judge seems to have accepted that he tried to assist but did not do enough, so it is difficult to see how there is any significant deterrence element (whether specific or general) at all.

Yes, and it is greatly appreciated. Keep up the good work.

Seems the judgement is vague enough to cause us this conundrum. Us being Scuba Divers, barristers, and those needing more substantial findings.
Which continues to make it an interesting case to follow.
 
I’ve been away from this forum for a bit, so I will respond to some older posts.

All along I’ve questioned how anyone could prove Watson turned off Tina’s air. I’ve said that apart from her having died, there is no evidence Watson turned off her air. And, as far as Tina having died, there are other explanations than that her air was shut off. Those factors combined with Watson’s apparent explanation that he panicked and did not properly render assistance to Tina could certainly lead to reasonable doubt.

IMHO, it was a brilliant move for Watson to accept a degree of blame in the form of acknowledging that he panicked and did not properly render assistance to Tina. That would explain away a lot of what happened afterward. Since what happened afterward are circumstantial evidence of guilt, explaining them away diminishes their impact.

As far as whether Watson acted reasonably under water. I do not believe he did. I think most divers do not think he did. However, that is not the test for murder. In fact, that is why the prosecutor was able to get a plea to manslaughter. If Watson had acted reasonably, then the prosecutor probably could not have even gotten that.

A note on plea bargains.

On Monday, I had a hearing in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Several matters that were on the court’s calendar before my case were criminal cases in which defendants were pleading guilty. I was amazed by how much time the Judge spent ensuring that each defendant knew what he or she was doing, that each knew he or she did not need to plead guilty, and that there was a factual basis for the plea. After going through the litany with each defendant, the Judge questioned the defense attorneys about whether they believed there was evidence that would support a finding of guilt and whether they believed their clients knew and understood the consequences of their pleas, etc. Quite simply the Judge seemed quite unwilling to allow a defendant to plead guilty just for expediency.

Regarding duty of care.

For tort purposes, Watson’s assurances to Tina and her family may be a basis for finding a duty of care. I do not think they do so for criminal liability.

As far as tort liability and professional rescuers, the California Supreme Court, which is considered to be very liberal, has held that even a professional rescuer does not have a duty of care to initiate a rescue. That was in the context of paramedics who stood by and watched someone “bleed out” and were then sued by the decedent’s family. Fascinating.

Another comment based on several posts:

Having read the Judge’s statements at the sentencing, I believe the whole thing to be a bit “contrived.” That is, I think the Judge does not actually believe Watson was guilty of any crime, but was unwilling to refuse the plea. When the Judge listed the factors that supported a finding of guilt, he commented about Watson not ensuring Tina had enough air and about Watson not sharing his air. It is true he didn’t. But, was there any evidence of any need to share air? Tina’s regulator was functioning properly and she had plenty of gas … according to the reports. I think the good Judge was forced to come up with some factors to support acceptance of the plea and might otherwise have been willing to dismiss all charges.

As far as Watson returning voluntarily, I think that is also contrived. Perhaps he did so because he planned on going to trial on a murder charge and on beating it by showing there was reasonable doubt. However, the Judge took this as a showing of remorse.

I am not certain I would have accepted the guilty plea. I’m glad I wasn’t the judge.
 

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