HalcyonDaze
Contributor
And yes, I have to admit that historically, any reforms or improvement in safety for US vessels (and other countries' too) have followed a major casualty, and don't precede it. So yes, as one earlier commenter here has said, in general the marine safety regulations are indeed "written in blood". Why don't see ahead to that accident waiting to happen? I can't answer that. Maybe a sociologist (or in some cases an accountant) can?
Let's look at the record, at least what I remember or learned, about improvements that resulted from a particular tragedy on the water:
Back in the 1860s, the (overloaded) passenger riverboat SULTANA, awful fire and great loss of life after a boiler explosion: -- Licensing of Engineers, and improvements in boiler safety valves.
1903, the passenger boat GENERAL SLOCUM in New York, fire causing over 1000 deaths. -- improvements in fire equipment and hoses, and inspection standards.
1912, TITANIC, improvement in watertight compartment standards, International Ice Patrol established, radiotelegraph requirements, and of course, enough lifeboats for all passengers and crew.
1934, Passenger liner MORRO CASTLE, caught fire (probably arson) and burned through during a storm, grounded on a New Jersey beach, 137 deaths. ---no more beautiful (but flammable) wood-construction interiors; fire-resistant materials required thereafter, and alarms rather than relying solely on fire watch rounds-makers, at least for US liners.
1956, ANDREA DORIA / STOCKHOLM collision in fog, DORIA sank, 46 deaths: -- advancements in radar plotting and radar use, establishment of shipping lanes in areas of traffic convergence.
There are a whole lot more. Yes, "if only" we had forseen and regulated-in-advance preventive measures, instead of afterward. We may add "Conception" to this list now, albeit for a very small number of vessels. New regs coming (I believe there's already a pro-forma bill in the House?), but short-term, night watchstanders actually being there, and being watchstanders--and walkers.
I'll touch on the money angle tangentially, but there are also some other factors. Several of the disasters you cited happened during extremely lax regulatory periods. Nobody was held accountable for the Sultana and while eight were indicted for the General Slocum fire, only the captain was found guilty on a single charge of criminal negligence - and he was only sentenced to 10 years in prison, being paroled after three and pardoned after Theodore Roosevelt left office. In both cases, that kind of who-GAS safety attitude was par for the course across society. Remember, that was also the era of the Iroquois Theater and Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fires, and even after those disasters spurred a few changes it would be another 30-40 years or so before the Cocoanut Grove fire really prompted more widespread fire safety regulations. Even then, we still have mass-casualty fires to this day where existing regulations are not enforced or don't cover the situation in question.
There is also the issue of technology advancing faster than the regulations. One of the factors in the Titanic disaster was that the British Board of Trade regulations required vessels over 10,000 tons to carry 16 lifeboats with a capacity of 990 occupants. Those regulations were written before there were 50,000-ton ocean liners with capacity for over 2,000 passengers and crew and were never updated, and in any case it was thought that in the age of wireless a ship would sink slowly enough for help to arrive and relegate the lifeboats to use as ferries to rescue ships. More relevant to this discussion, the proliferation of modern electronics has gotten to a point where even a 1970s-design Nimitz-class supercarrier with a pair of 100 MW nuclear reactors has issues with modern "hotel loads" (electrical demand on habitable spaces). For me, the biggest red flag I've seen out of the Conception exhibits was the jury-rigged wiring and power strips for electrical loads that an early 1980s boat was never made to support.
Finally, there's what I call the "is this really necessary/inconvenience/conflict" factor, which can be financial. Let's say at some point before last year, you had a boat with a very thorough roving watch making the rounds through all compartments including the berthing spaces. After enough complaints from light sleepers about the crewman clomping past or overhead several times during the night, the likelihood of a fast-moving fire at night might get weighed against those complaints (especially if the Coast Guard hasn't cited a vessel for lack of a roving patrol in 30+ years). On a more serious note, as has been stated a refitted escape like the one on the Vision might run afoul of other regulations, and whichever one is more consistently enforced/carries greater penalties prevails.
I will also say that in my recent work experience, corporate safety people tend to be more focused on maintaining a paper trail against lawsuits than actually making useful suggestions - my crown jewel was after taking a very minor stingray hit in the ankle, our corporate safety officer asked why we didn't wear steel-toed or otherwise protective boots while wading. Cue sarcastic explanation of how one can drown in chest-deep water while wearing 2.5-pound boots on a soft substrate (hilariously, the "Ray-Guard" boots they made us buy afterwards have a tiny little mesh drain hole ... about an inch from the exact location where I got jabbed). More recently we were pestered about having to maintain heat stress and stepback forms while simultaneously being pressured to dive in conditions I balked at (low viz, strong tidal exchange, repetitive dives past 30 ft, and heavy traffic from jetskis to container ships) and throw divers at the project who hadn't done work dives before or yet received their medical clearance. If the regulations aren't written in spilled blood, they're written by people afraid of spilling blood and not afraid to raise hell about it.
Also, as Ken Kurtis has repeatedly pointed out, whatever regs come out of this are not going to just apply to a "relatively small number of vessels" - it should apply to every similarly engaged passenger vessel such as overnight recreational fishing vessels. That the Conception was specifically engaged in diving is irrelevant to the matter.