Ginnie Springs diver missing - Florida

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I may get some heat from sharing this, but I was told this information by someone who's typcially considered a reputable source and know quite a few people who know this information as well. So in the local community of cave country it's what I would consider "common knowledge".
It's believed that the incident was caused by the inline shutoff on the oxygen being inadvertandly turned off while the diver passed through a restirction, and the diver never noticed the drop in p02.
I believe this is important for people to know because one of my criticisms of the sidewinder (after having taken the course) is the use of an inline shutoff on the oxygen side. I've always felt that although it's probably safe in most instances, if a diver gets distracted enough and doesn't realize it's shut off and doesn't monitor their p02 as they should it will lead to deaths.
Whether this is factual or not (though I believe it is), sidewinder divers should keep it in their mind.
 
Are there any inline shutoffs that lock on? I have a couple of the DGX inline shut offs (they accidentally threw it in an order) and they easily slide back and forth. Look at the description of the other inline shutoffs on DGX they all easily slide. I would think for this situation you would want one that locks on, requiring a purposeful movement to turn off, but easily will slide over to on.
 
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Are there any inline shutoffs that lock on? I have a couple of the DGX inline shut offs (they accidentally threw it in an order) and they easily slide back and forth. Look at the description of the other inline shutoffs on DGX they all easily slide. I would think for this situation you would want one that locks on, requiring a purposeful movement to turn off, but easily will slide over to on.

I am not aware of any.

Also of note, IF all of the facts are correct as presented, the diver should have been listening to the whine of the CMF, should have checked his ppO2 at some point, had failed to maintain min-loop volume, etc. A locking inline shutoff may not have done anything, a valve off may not have done anything as the shutoff may have been intentional. Haptic feedback would probably be the only equipment solution to this skills problem that would have changed the outcome. I do not know why Shearwater hasn't adopted this as it is a massive increase in rebreather safety. You can miss a light, you don't miss the pornstar-grade dildo going off on your arm when the Divesoft computers hit a ppO2 limit... Nor does your buddy if they are within about 20ft of you
 
I keep reading needing more equipment to solve a skills problem. Why the change of heart when it comes to this circumstance?
 
I just don’t understand how, as a separate argument, others can state that, just because we won’t learn anything unique that there’s no value to the exercise.

Regarding my earlier post in this thread about looking to the public records of law enforcement, coroners and litigation with the expectation of determining the cause of a rebreather accident is an unrealistic expectation. Just to be clear, I did not mean to imply (and perhaps there was no implication that I implied :)) investigations into the causes of closed-circuit accidents is an unnecessary or unproductive exercise. Rather, it is unfortunate we have no infrastructure that can perform such investigations without fear of consequences (such as the NTSB in transportation accidents), plus recently the optics and liability concerns have made various resources for expert collection of data and analysis even more scarce.

While the blizzard of speculation and sometimes misinformation propagated both privately and by various public discussion forums might in some cases serve a purpose of education if not investigation, IMO it can at best do about as much good as harm and in some cases do more harm than good. On the positive side (if it could be said there is such), we already do have a body of knowledge that could immediately help reduce a great many of the common and reasonably well understood causes for rebreather accidents.
 
I keep reading needing more equipment to solve a skills problem. Why the change of heart when it comes to this circumstance?

I fly helicopters for a living. Most of my flying is done at or around 100' AGL and around 120 knots. Part of my training is having an extremely fast outside/inside crosscheck with a focus on altitude and airspeed. If I'm not checking my altitude and looking ahead every couple seconds, I'm wrong. I should always know my flight parameters at every moment. But we also have this little piece of gear called the AWS on board. Altitude Warning System. It's set to audibly alert the crew if you go below a preset altitude. Most people refer to it as the "bitching betty". It's on almost every military aircraft that I know of. And I would never take a helicopter without a functional one. 99.9% of the time when I've tripped it, I knew it was going to happen because I was crossing a hill or ridgeline or something. But on the handful of times it surprised me, it probably saved my life. A HUD or haptic alerts on a rebreather is exactly the same in my mind. It doesn't absolve you of your responsibility to know your PO2 at all times, but it keeps those occasional lapses from being fatal. There's no downside to having it.
 
Indeed, the lost of buoyancy would act as a reminder you need to check your monitor.
You won't notice it on a scooter.
 
I fly helicopters for a living. Most of my flying is done at or around 100' AGL and around 120 knots. Part of my training is having an extremely fast outside/inside crosscheck with a focus on altitude and airspeed. If I'm not checking my altitude and looking ahead every couple seconds, I'm wrong. I should always know my flight parameters at every moment. But we also have this little piece of gear called the AWS on board. Altitude Warning System. It's set to audibly alert the crew if you go below a preset altitude. Most people refer to it as the "bitching betty". It's on almost every military aircraft that I know of. And I would never take a helicopter without a functional one. 99.9% of the time when I've tripped it, I knew it was going to happen because I was crossing a hill or ridgeline or something. But on the handful of times it surprised me, it probably saved my life. A HUD or haptic alerts on a rebreather is exactly the same in my mind. It doesn't absolve you of your responsibility to know your PO2 at all times, but it keeps those occasional lapses from being fatal. There's no downside to having it.

^^

Task loading and perceptual narrowing are real things. I challenge everyone that doubts it to spent a minute and take this awareness test.

 
I keep reading needing more equipment to solve a skills problem. Why the change of heart when it comes to this circumstance?

I don't get that we're looking for an equipment solution. I think tbone was just giving his opinion on something that could be beneficial. Unfortunately it's truly something that's unnecessary if you're doing a good job of being mentally aware of you rebreather, but it seems alot of divers become complacent and distracted and fail to follow the basics.
I think thus far the assumptions most are making is this was caused by a distracted diver, who many feel was diving above his skill level.
 

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