Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

[Luis H]

I'm glad that this post has been written, as it does summarize a lot of discussion points in this thread very well.

I can't help but notice, however, that it leaves out the entire discussion on the configuration of the egress routes. It is a fact that was established in this thread, that the only emergency escape hatch was a square whole in the ceiling compartment straddling two 3-level bunks, slightly larger than 2x2', the fact that investigating authorities were "taken aback" by. It is a fact that in case of fire or flooding up to 46 people were expected to exit either through that hatch, or through the narrow staircase leading to the front of the galley, requiring them to travel the full length of the galley back to get to the open deck, or shutter the windows in the front.

These facts may not be known to readers/posters who didn't have time to read the entire thread, and who I believe are the intended audience of this summary.

Also, not a fact directly related to the accident per se, but a fact nevertheless: USCG requirements currently lack specific measurable metrics that would remove subjectivity from the inspection process. Specifically, the time required to evacuate all passengers, and the "easiness" of access to exits are not defined in the code, leaving it to the inspecting officer to subjectively interpret very vague verbiage.

I'm not pointing it out simply because I believe the design of egress routes is one of the biggest contributing factors here, which I absolutely do, but because there was a lot of extremely useful info in this thread such as pictures, videos, and deck layouts of the Conception, as well as links to relevant sections of the USCG code.

The design and implementation of emergency escape routes has been an important subject in vessel design for a very long time. For commercial vessels the document that is most often referred to is the ASTM F1166: Standard Practice for Human Engineering Design for Marine Systems, Equipment, and Facilities

http://web.askewindustrial.com/ASTM2014/2b0d0d1826f37f7659abbea102892851.pdf?tblASTMSpecsPage=79


The document covers requirements and recommendation for emergency exits. It is very generic to try to apply to many circumstances and designs. It has recommended and minimum sizes for egress openings, ladder requirements and recommendations, etc.

There are many human factors studies behind ASTM F1166 (and the military equivalent: Mil-STD-1472).

I asked the question if this document was invoked by the CFR or the USCG and Wookie replied that it is not, but that USCG could invoke it. From looking at the pictures of the escape route I guess it should be obvious that they didn’t.

I included a picture of the escape route on its sister vessel in post #1035. I was surprised and shocked to see such an escape route in a passenger vessel.

 

[cerich]

Hi cerich,

Your post is right-on. I hope people read it again. Which is why an anchor watch/fire watch person needs to take their job so seriously. Minutes count. Once the fire had reached a conflagration point, there really wasn't anything that anyone could do.

During the daytime, a battery fire would probably be dealt with in a few moments. Wookie has written that he occasionally disposed of smoldering or burning batteries overboard.

Here is what I would think if I witnessed Wookie chucking a smoldering/burning battery overboard:

"No big deal, it is done, nothing to see here".

"Whew...thank God the smoking battery issue is resolved...could you pass me The Macalan Scotch...after that near miss I am done diving for the day" (TA boats are BYOB)

markm

having stood a few anchor watches.. from small yachts, harbour commercial vessel, square rigger, destroyers and submarines... for those not familiar with what exactly it entails. Which depending a bit on vessel can vary.

First, you are awake and alert. You are the eyes that are there to keep the vessel and occupants safe. On a larger ship, you may be part of a team but for the person with anchor watch, your job is basically visual lookout for approaching vessels and making sure you are riding correct at anchor(buoy), not dragging the hook (or fouled up) and looking for anything that is not right. To do that means time in the wheelhouse/bridge (conning tower on a sub) and also going to the bows and visually confirming the lay of the anchor chain(as in how it is secured, what direction the chain is laying etc) Part of a team in a naval vessel you may have someone on the scope in ops and using electronics to verify position (and in the days of Loran C if they noticed you moved before the anchor watchman did..you didn't do your job), below decks you will have roundsman(singular or plural depending) who'e job it is to walk and check all spaces that don't have people awake and working, making sure the ship is safe. The roundsmans job is first responder, alarm raiser and rules enforcer.

That's big ships with manpower. Smaller with less manpower the anchor watch can often be a single person awake with all crew sleeping. They need to watching the anchor, radar, GPS (now days a well outfitted electronic plot has position, traffic(of those that are broadcasting theirs), radar in one convenient place), the anchorage for traffic/weather, going forward and visually checking anchor, walking the uppers and sticking your head in all the spaces to look for fire, smoke, flood, weird smells,weird sounds, hatches left open that should be shut or the opposite or ANYTHING that looks out of place and taking appropriate corrective action. It actually should be busy for the single person on watch because you have a HUGE responsibility and LOTS to do if you are doing your job correctly. The ships master should have the routine for the anchor watch CLEARLY laid out either in ships SOP's or night orders and crew should have been fully trained and tested on their competency before being permitted to stand anchor watch alone.. That all said, for as many proper anchor watches out there, there are lots where the person worked all day and is half awake in the wheelhouse staying warm, doing something that has nothing to do with their job (book, phone, whatever).

 

[cerich]

Question what the role of the person awake is. And if that is actually firewatch, where I fully agree minutes count, why would a decentralized smoke alarm be sufficient? suspect the watch is not a firewatch in the very strict sense of the word.

see my previous post where I answered this before I saw you asking

 

[shoredivr]

I would think that should be called "Adding insult to injury." Legal, but outrageous!

No, it’s how the system works.

 

[cerich]

And this fire 'reflashed' repeatedly after Coast Guard first put it out, even with all that water from 5" (?) hoses on fire fighting boats.

reflash with that much heat is almost to be expected, especially if fuel tanks compromised, really oily bilges, lithium based fires and having used only water to fight the fire. Knocking the flames down is easy compared to getting the heat low enough it won't reflash, and the amount of water needed to do that on a boat will often sink the boat. I have no idea if they were using only water or AFFF along with. AFFF is really awesome for shipboard firefighting because of these issues. But..

 

[KevinNM]

3 thoughts I'm wondering about now:
- was there no fire extinguishers available at the top deck for the crew to use? Nothing's mentioned so far in all the interviews with them that they did use any to clear the way down to dive deck instead of jumping and then trying to clear at least the short distance from the galley door to escape hatch

- if there was a cellular coverage there, checking when did the mobile phones of the victims logged out of network could give some indication when did the fire start/consume the electronics

- I am o an opinion that regardless whether fire started in the galley or bunk area, passengers died in their sleep due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Gives me a bit of consolation knowing that the one of the last things they remembered doing was diving those beautiful islands...

p.s. please mods, let the discussion continue

When discovered the fire was far past where a fire extinguisher would help. The entire room was on fire. What you needed to have a chance was a dozen trained firefighters in bunker gear and a couple of fire engines. What they had was 1 guy with a broken leg and 4 guys in t-shirts with no equipment. It was hopeless.

 

[cerich]

reflash with that much heat is almost to be expected, especially if fuel tanks compromised, really oily bilges, lithium based fires and having used only water to fight the fire. Knocking the flames down is easy compared to getting the heat low enough it won't reflash, and the amount of water needed to do that on a boat will often sink the boat. I have no idea if they were using only water or AFFF along with. AFFF is really awesome for shipboard firefighting because of these issues. But..

given that AFFF now has a bad rap on environmental issues, and it was California, I would actually be surprised if it was used.

Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) Legislation Sweeping the US – NCMA

 

[Scuba-74]

I asked the question if this document was invoked by the CFR or the USCG and Wookie replied that it is not, but that USCG could invoke it. From looking at the pictures of the escape route I guess it should be obvious that they didn’t.

I included a picture of the escape route on its sister vessel in post #1035. I was surprised and shocked to see such an escape route in a passenger vessel.

I'm just trying to picture the whole inspection process. An officer comes aboard, goes through the checklist of things in painstaking and thorough manner, as some posters pointed out. Reaches the part where it says there must be at least two exists "sufficient for rapid evacuation in an emergency for the number of persons served (§ 177.500.(d))", and allowing "easy movement of persons when wearing life jackets (§ 177.500.(e))". He/she looks at the hatch, that's difficult enough to use even for a person already sitting in that top bunk without any darn life jacket, looks at the maze of bunks in berthing quarters more crowded than anything I've ever seen aboard any vessel except for maybe early WWII submarines, and somehow in his/her mind concludes, sure, I totally see how you can easily move 46 untrained, unprepared persons in life jackets through that pretty rapidly. And here is my signature to go with that conclusion.

I feel nothing but anger when I picture this. In my opinion, personal accountability for that decision must come into play big time.

 

[markmud]

Way to go cerich! Multiple Grand Slams!
Fire on dive boat Conception in CA
Fire on dive boat Conception in CA
Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

 

[rjack321]

given that AFFF now has a bad rap on environmental issues, and it was California, I would actually be surprised if it was used.

Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) Legislation Sweeping the US – NCMA

There are non-PFAS substitutions to the AFFFs of the past already in use with many local FDs and even with some FAA certified airport FDs. I am not familiar with LA and CG non-PFAS adoption. I would expect LA area fireboats to have transitioned to non-PFAS alternatives already, while the CG being under a different set of mil-spec obligations probably hasn't changed over yet. Its not just "the environment" much of the impetus for changing to non-PFAS AFFF has actually came from professional firefighters, the exposures were killing them.

I would be surprised if AFFF was used as well but mostly because this was basically fought as a structure fire by the time responders arrived and I don't see any fuel burning on the water. I didn't see any foam in the pictures either.