Scuba-74
Contributor
It is always best to read an entire thread before commenting but due to the length of this one we are providing a summary for topics already covered.
A ScubaBoard Staff Message...
The following has been established as credible based on information provided by people with experience as qualified mariners or experience on the Conception and similar boats. While we believe this information is credible it can not be established as proven facts prior to the completion of the investigation.
Conception was found compliant with USCG requirements on her last inspection which implies
Approved fire alarms
Approved fire fighting equipment
Escape routes met current standards
Nitrox system was a Membrane system
Only O2 on board would be in First aid tanks or stage bottles. All tanks were aft and aft was last to burn
One body remains missing
4 bodies were found floating shortly after the sinking. All bodies will be identified by DNA.
There was an anchor watch normally posted in the wheelhouse. People from previous trips have reported meeting the "watchman" at various times during nocturnal trips to the head etc
There were no locked doors to the galley, salon or berth area.
It has been reported that at about 2:30 crew member finished up in the galley verifying all heating elements were out and cold etc. Then went upstairs.
Between 3 and 3:14, a crew member awoke hearing a bang. Thinking someone had fallen went to go down but stairs already afire.
The Captain first Mayday from the Bridge documented at 3:14am.
Captain last to leave with so much smoke around him crew thought he was on fire
Another Mayday call was made from the Grape Escape.. The calls have been linked together causing confusion
5 crew members were in the wheelhouse two levels above the berth area. One crew member was in the berth below and did not survive.
The crew tried to reach the passengers from both doors to the galley and from forward front windows. They were driven back by the fire (some were injured in the attempt)
Forced from the boat by the fire they swam aft to the dingy, sought help from the nearby boat. The Captain returned to look for others with no success.
There has been suggestions from many sources the fire could be related to charging batteries either in the Galley or possibly berth area
It has been established that electrical fires are often a factor in boat fires
Safety briefs were regularly conducted at the first opportunity when all on board were available normally the first morning of the trip
The above topics have been covered extensively. Please refer back in the thread for those discussions.
Discussion of legal aspects should be made here Legal considerations for the Fire on dive boat Conception in CA
Condolences posted here Santa Cruz Dive Boat Fire Incident Condolences
Donations here Dive Boat Conception Missing Divers Relief Fund
I'm glad that this post has been written, as it does summarize a lot of discussion points in this thread very well.
I can't help but notice, however, that it leaves out the entire discussion on the configuration of the egress routes. It is a fact that was established in this thread, that the only emergency escape hatch was a square whole in the ceiling compartment straddling two 3-level bunks, slightly larger than 2x2', the fact that investigating authorities were "taken aback" by. It is a fact that in case of fire or flooding up to 46 people were expected to exit either through that hatch, or through the narrow staircase leading to the front of the galley, requiring them to travel the full length of the galley back to get to the open deck, or shutter the windows in the front.
These facts may not be known to readers/posters who didn't have time to read the entire thread, and who I believe are the intended audience of this summary.
Also, not a fact directly related to the accident per se, but a fact nevertheless: USCG requirements currently lack specific measurable metrics that would remove subjectivity from the inspection process. Specifically, the time required to evacuate all passengers, and the "easiness" of access to exits are not defined in the code, leaving it to the inspecting officer to subjectively interpret very vague verbiage.
I'm not pointing it out simply because I believe the design of egress routes is one of the biggest contributing factors here, which I absolutely do, but because there was a lot of extremely useful info in this thread such as pictures, videos, and deck layouts of the Conception, as well as links to relevant sections of the USCG code.