First time post, long time diver (certified 1987, shot more Kodachrome underwater than I can count). I've followed this incident and thread since the beginning. A true tragedy, and my heart still aches for the familes, crew, owners, friends, and dive community. I wanted to add a few comments here (edit: removed reference to prior mentions of WaveDancer tragedy).
This is not the first mass-tragedy on a LOB. Another incident killed 20 people in the middle of the night, sleeping below-deck on an LOB, in which lack of eggress was a major contributing cause. It's incredibly surprising how few folks are aware of this incident. I frequented that boat several times; my LOB heyday was in the 80s through the early 2000s, I did 2/3 liveaboard trips every year. What incident was this? I'm talking about the Wavedancer tragedy in Belize on Oct. 8, 2001.
It's worth reading about this, and there's a dedicated web page to document the events. You won't find much more information, frankly, as the dive industry, dive publications, and the Belize government all conspired to bury this incident, and they've beem amazingly successful (and it didn't help that this occured less than a month after the events of 9-11). For example, DAN didn't even mention this tragedy in any of their newsletters, even though the entire Virginia dive club had acquired DAN insurance. There isn't even a Wikipedia page for this incident, that killed 17 Americans and 3 crew members. Putting the Wavedancer down the memory hole is a subtopic for discussion at another time, perhaps, but at a minimum, it appears the Conception tragedy won't suffer the same fate, given the wide initial coverage we've seen here.
The basic facts are the Wavedancer sought shelter from incoming hurricane Iris, and dithered as to where to seek safe shelter for over 2 days. Eventually, the captain decided to moor at a dock 2 miles up the Monkey River (about 75 miles south of Belize City), at Big Creek. The crew tied Wavedancer to the dock, and the Belize Aggressor III (another lob I've been on 3/4 times) tied up alongside. In the middle of the night, the storm surge came up the river. The Wavedancer was lifted hard onto the dock, straining the mooring lines. As the surge passed, the Wavedancer fell hard to her side, and capsized in 12 feet of water. The boat half-submerged, and the sleeping quarters went underwater. Most victims drowned, unable to escape. Many victims had head injuries and other injuries, consistent with violent movements of the boat itself.
The investigation of this disaster was headed by the Belize government, and it was a total sham. They eventually blamed the captain, who was initially held by the Belize government, but released when Peter Hughes (the boat's owner) came to Belize and lobbied for his release. The Captain quickly fled the country to his native New Zealand. The investigation didn't even interview the surviving passengers. They submitted written statements, which were held by the investigation for years and never publically disclosed.
What did we learn from this tragedy? Clearly, egress from cramped sleeping quarters in an emergency is a huge issue on these boats. I followed this tragedy closely back in 2001, as best I could. I kept thinking, how could scuba divers drown on a boat in 12 feet of water? I started bringing my small emergency air source into my cabin with me, a little self-contained pony bottle (Spare Air? I think). Those 3-5 minutes of air could be the difference between life and death in a lot of situations, I figured. I also kept my spare mask close-by, in my bunk.
Now, I have no idea if this would help those on the Conception. The fire must have been completely impassable and intense. We also know that fumes are often fatal before the flames. In this case, an independent air source might very well be the difference in managing an escape. It's certainly something to think about for yourself.
There's more comments to make here regarding egress vs. early detection, and I'm of the opinion that you can't engineer a perfect egress system. Hence, early fire detection (and prevention, of course) is the absolute key to avoiding this type of tragedy in the future. How do we detect these events? That's a complex problem that's going to need lots of careful assessment. Simple smoke detectors seem inadequate here, give the single-point-of-failure that a fast-growing fire in interior spaces on an LOB presents. I'm sure we'll have much discussion of this as the investigation proceeds.
Anyway, please excuse this long first post. I hope you familiarize yourself with the tragedy on the Wavedancer, and vow to not let the Conception tragedy face the same pressures that buried that earlier catastrophe in the dive community.
