Firstly, BoulderJohns' format of questions are good at enabling a more structured analysis of the issues. However, the actual questions proposed have a tendency to be very
one-sided; that side being a justification of inaction. They ask the
costs of taking action, but do not ask the costs of
not taking action, nor do they consider the rewards. There are many
context analysis models available (SWOT, PEST etc etc) - none of them focus solely on negatives (costs) at the expense of positives (rewards).
No wonder some people/organizations think everything is just optimal... or change is impossible... if they use only cost-based
(negative) analysis models....
I have taken the liberty of supplementing the questions asked:
1. MASTER SCUBA DIVER
What is the problem being addressed?
Consumer/market perception that the MSD certification is valueless. This impacts the success of branding and devalues overall company reputation.
As the "pinnacle" of recreational, no-professional, diving training - the MSD fails to recognize 'pinnacle' level skills, training, knowledge or experience.
The MSD certification provides nothing meaningful for a proportion of divers to aspire to. I suspect that proportion is majority, but have no statistics to support this.
In parallel with this, there lacks a higher-level certification that recognizes any form of advanced recreational diving competency. There is also no training course that provides a foundation (assessment of fundamental skills) for further development beyond the recreational syllabus (i.e. a pre-tech course).
Other agencies do supply higher-level recreational training and present increasingly competitive attractions to consumers.
Is the proposed solution proportional to the problem?
Changing MSD from a 'recognition' into a training course would require a training course to be written. The agency would have to train/educate instructors to provide this training.
PADI release new courses frequently. There are existing courses, both standardized and distinctive, that already provide varied skills, performance standards and knowledge that could be incorporated into a newly designed MSD course.
The problem of low consumer demand for the MSD certification, and the absence of a true 'pinnacle' certification diminished consumer loyalty and causes a proportion of PADI-certified divers to seek alternative qualification through other agencies; especially at higher levels.
The problem of a training syllabus that does not increase demand/scope beyond the level of Rescue Diver prevents divers continually developing. There is stagnancy. This is most appreciable when recreational divers first enroll upon technical courses - where they are ill-prepared for higher-level demands. There is a discernable 'jump' in performance requirements - that 'jump' would be smoothed over by more continually progressive training to the pinnacle. The training progression from Open Water to CCR Trimix should be progressive in a smooth and seamless manner, without such 'jumps' being made.
What is the financial impact of your solution?
The costs of re-writing the MSD course (small) and re-introducing those changes through existing media/communications; i.e. existing instructor manual/training bulletins (small), is balanced against potential revenue from increased interest in a progressive, competency-assessed MSD course.
If a dedicated instructor manual/notes were deemed necessary, then the costs would be passed forwards to the instructor cadre (
as they are with most courses) - a profitable venture for the agency.
An MSD 'Course' would require a student manual. Again, if costed appropriately, this is a profit stream for the agency. Especially so when the increasing proliferation of eManuals is considered (low production costs/high income).
What is the financial impact of in-action?
The loss of revenue from those currently seeking MSD as a 'recognition level' balanced against the increase of revenue from those seeking MSD as a 'pinnacle' evaluation of recreational diving skill. This represents a market change and acknowledges that those divers committed to long-term continued education tend to be 'performance focused' and better educated about what performance can be attained through quality training.
Losing consumers to other agencies at recreational levels impacts upon future revenue streams from technical and CCR courses (
as those consumers rarely return to PADI). PADI has done much in recent years to develop and promote technical/CCR training syllabus - but has yet to identify the need to re-structure recreational training to better 'feed' appropriate students to technical/CCR levels.
What will the costs be for the agency? The diver?
Costs for the agency are minimal and generally offset by potential profitability.
The diver would have to pay for a course/dives/tuition, not just certification card application.
For the market segment that merely sought 'recognition', the MSD certification could be replaced by a simple diploma of recognition and/or appreciation.
Will anyone be willing to pay those costs to achieve that solution?
The success of courses such as 'GUE Fundamentals', plus the good market opinion these courses create, seems to indicate a consumer demand for true pinnacle level recreational dive training.
The numbers of PADI-developed divers switching to alternative agencies at advanced-recreational and/or technical levels indicates a willingness to pay costs if the training outcome represents value through increased/higher-level skills acquisition.
PADI could/should investigate consumer demand and trends through effective market research.
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2. DIVE MASTER
What is the problem being addressed?
Community perception that the DM training standards permits inexperienced/incompetent divers to be certified at professional level. Professional level divers may have less experience than the customers they are supervising.
DM training standards may be perceived as promoting a materialistic approach to training progression; a sense of 'credit-card entitlement' for those who "want everything now" without the integrity to apply patience, resolve and commitment to diving education. This creates 'card-holders', but not 'skill-holders' and may be seen as a weak foundation for supervisory or instructional level divers.
That attitude, where it is perceived by consumers, undermines the stated goals of Divemaster training, specifically the need for 'role-model' behavior and the critical formation of leadership potential. A Divemaster is a leader. Leadership demands the creation of respect. The current Divemaster prerequisites and performance standards do not guarantee the creation of graduates who can earn respect. Hence, the leadership model is flawed.
The current prerequisites, performance standards, membership agreement and quality assurance system applied to both Divemaster certification
and post-graduation conduct do not achieve their stated aims. They do not guarantee the creation of professional supervisory-level divers with a responsible, risk-adverse mentality, role-model behavior and sufficient skills/experience to ensure the safety of divers under their professional duty-of-care.
This serves to degrade public perception of the Divemaster qualification and the agency that produces them. It also jeopardizes diver safety.
Is the proposed solution proportional to the problem?
In respect of diver safety, it is implausible to expect statistics to define a problem. Only fatality statistics are available. There is no means to globally measure 'near-miss' or non-serious injury (requiring hyperbaric treatment) injuries. Safety cannot be measured only be fatalities or hyperbaric treatments. Fatalities and hyperbaric treatments represent only the 'tip of the iceberg' that is reported to DAN. Furthermore, PADI only take responsibility for safety during training courses. They abjectly disassociate themselves from non-training activities. The bulk of Divemaster employment (
in most regions) is within non-training activities (
i.e. supervising certified divers). This can create a very skewed perspective on the issue of 'diver safety', especially in relation to Divemaster conduct.
In respect to consumer perspective, the perception that Divemasters do not represent a high-standard of experience and training is detrimental to the overall agency branding and market image. It decreases the value attributed to the work of Divemasters by consumers. Where the QA process fails (or even attempts) to ensure DM training and post-graduate conduct matches the standards and corporate goals/mission of the agency - consumers recognize a disconnect between what is promised and what is delivered. This disconnect causes consumer dissatisfaction.
What is the financial impact of your solution?
The actual expenditure needed to raise prerequsities and/or training standards for Divemaster courses is nil. Such changes are effected through amendments in the routinely re-issued Instructor Manual (annual re-issue) and Quarterly Training Bulletins. PADI has been amending DM courses standards frequently, for many years - but those amendments have typically represented a downwards trend (
less prerequisites/less comprehensive training).
The main financial impact from increasing Divemaster entry and training standards would be on professional-level certification revenue. Raising Divemaster training prerequisites (
qualifications and logged experience) would decrease the demand for training and reduce profitability of the Go-Pro system. The Divemaster qualification would cease to be something that was easily attained, with little preparation, in a short time-scale and with little expenditure of time or money. As such, it would not represent an attractive option for 'zero-to-hero' training schemes, card-collectors, dilettantes or wannabies.
Reducing the flow of Divemaster graduates would have the proportional knock-on effect of reducing the consumer pool for progression to instructor training, thus further reducing revenue from IDC/IE provision and higher-level membership payments. This is a major revenue line for PADI - and further supports a '
market domination through saturation' business strategy.
There are many dive operations that focus their business model on high-volume training, and this includes professional levels. Reducing turn-over of Divemaster candidates would necessitate strategy chances. If volume reduces and training timescales increase, then a proportionally higher course cost would be charged.
Furthermore, a saturation of qualified dive professionals at Divemaster and Instructor levels creates an 'employer's market' in the diving industry. This enables employers to decrease the salary expectations of employees significantly; often to the point of zero. Reducing turn-over of Divemasters/Instructors through increased training demands/commitment would decrease the pool of available manpower - increasingly shifting the employment market from 'employer' to 'job seeker' - which would result in demands for more equitable financial compensation. The knock-on effect of this would be elevated costs transmitted to the consumer (
it would cost more to dive, because the dive operation would have to pay the Divemaster more...)
What is the financial impact of in-action?
Little.
PADI can disassociate itself from the working performance of Divemasters, because it does not concern itself with QA of non-training activities (the majority of divemaster duties). Any post-graduation failings in the Divemaster program are irrelevant to the agency. There is no study of whether graduates from training are meeting the goals of the Divemaster program and performing according to the expectations inherent within those goals. There is no motivation for the agency to conduct such study or to institute QA for non-training activities by it's pro membership. The agency remains liability-proof against those failings through non-agency relationships with professionals and operations.
The dive industry continues to enjoy a status-quo that provides a surplus of cheap manpower.
The diving consumer suffers variable quality (some dangerously so) divemaster supervising dives. The majority of novice/'light' divers are rarely aware of that variable quality. Those that are aware face little option for choice. Where some choice does exist in a given market/region/area, those seeking a preference (having identified a 'good' divemaster) rarely represent enough of a market proportion to significantly influence local business motivations or decision making.
What will the costs be for the agency? The diver?
Cost for agency already outlined - lost revenue for pro training programs.
Costs for operations already outlined - increased workforce costs through higher salary expectations
Costs (
financial) for the diver already outlined - increased diving costs through transmission of increased workforce salaries.
Cost (
safety) for the diver - undefined because no system exists to monitor diver safety beyond statistical compilation of fatality/hyperbaric incidents through 3rd party organization (DAN). The vast majority of safety issues, including near-misses and issues that require general medical treatment (not reported as diving incidents) do not feature in diving safety statistics.
Will anyone be willing to pay those costs to achieve that solution?
The issue of change would be dictated on an
ethics versus profits basis. There would be no profit incentive to increase requirements. The impact of profit incentive has been illustrated by continual requirement reductions over time.