Wesley Skiles' widow suing over rebreather

Please register or login

Welcome to ScubaBoard, the world's largest scuba diving community. Registration is not required to read the forums, but we encourage you to join. Joining has its benefits and enables you to participate in the discussions.

Benefits of registering include

  • Ability to post and comment on topics and discussions.
  • A Free photo gallery to share your dive photos with the world.
  • You can make this box go away

Joining is quick and easy. Log in or Register now!

If you flush and the unit starts adding O2, then the unit was working all along and you have achieved nothing by flushing.

Mike

I wouldn't say you've accomplished nothing, you've confirmed the operation of the O2 sensors across a wider range, confirmed the solenoid is working and not stuck open/closed, confirmed the controller is working properly, etc. Confirming everything is working properly is not the worst thing in the world.
 
I wouldn't say you've accomplished nothing, you've confirmed the operation of the O2 sensors across a wider range, confirmed the solenoid is working and not stuck open/closed, confirmed the controller is working properly, etc. Confirming everything is working properly is not the worst thing in the world.
O2 sensors die by becoming current limited - if they were reading 1.3 two minutes ago, they are going to work at 0.7. Checking that they read higher by adding O2 is a much more relevant test of your sensors.
All the rest of your list has been confirmed in the last couple of minutes by monitoring your guages and hearing the solenoid fire. You should be very well attuned to the normal solenoid firing interval, and how depth changes etc affect it.

In 400 ish hours of rebreather diving I've never had to do a dil flush for real to solve any problem. But I add O2 manually on every dive.
Hyperoxia doesn't worry me, but Hypoxia scares the hell out of me. A minute of two of a PPO2 of 2.0 won't hurt, but seconds on 0.1 will.

Mike
 
Drive along the road at 100 and take you hands off the wheel for a couple of minutes - and you will die.

You're missing major parts in your analogies.

Only someone who is suicidal would drive 100 M/H with no hands because it's obviously hugely dangerous on it's face. Also, the car doesn't (usually) put the driver to sleep before killing him.

Go a couple of hundred meters into a cave with a single tank and run out of gas - and you will die.

Yes, caves are dangerous for untrained divers, that's why all OW classes warn against entering them

Lie face down in the bath and don't raise your head to breathe - and you will die.

Again, the bathtub doesn't put you to sleep before drowning you. Quite the opposite, drowning makes people panic, and leave the bathtub if possible.

Seems that cars, OC scuba and bathtubs are not ready for "prime time" either by that logic.

If you're going to use flawed logic, I suppose you can draw any conclusion you like.

flots.
 
You're missing major parts in your analogies.
Who cares about this pedantic analysis of analogies??
The only point I wanted to make was that many things can be dangerous if used incorrectly.
Rebreathers are not dangerous if used correctly. And using one correctly includes understanding how to monitor their continued function, and work around occasional failures.
I've known people who have died on rebreathers. I've also known people who have died driving cars. In both cases, each of them died due to running out of talent, not because the rebreather or car stopped behaving as expected.
Use your (rebreather / car / OC gear / bathtub) correctly and you will be fine.

Mike
 
At the risk of flogging this dead horse any more please understand the context of my post...Using air as a SCR gas is equally stupid. Again the context that I was debating was the asinine claim that if Wes had been hypoxic a dil flush with air prior to ascent would have saved...

Thanks. I absolutely did not understand the context of your post. I agree the Dil flush may not have been the most appropriate course of action, but you'll recall that I still think that hypoxia was a possible but not a probable cause of the accident.

No need to call people muppets, though. I find most non-CCR divers can't seem to visualize how an RB works because it's such an alarmingly simple concept. People want to make it difficult and it just isn't.
 
Who cares about this pedantic analysis of analogies??
The only point I wanted to make was that many things can be dangerous if used incorrectly.
Rebreathers are not dangerous if used correctly. And using one correctly includes understanding how to monitor their continued function, and work around occasional failures.

My point was that the other items you mentioned required active, obvious stupidity in order to kill the operator, and give ample opportunity for a correction before anything bad happens, while a re-breather requires nothing more than a mechanical or electronic failure or simply not being perfect at following procedures.

flots.
 
Se7en:
Drive along the road at 100 and take you hands off the wheel for a couple of minutes - and you will die.
Go a couple of hundred meters into a cave with a single tank and run out of gas - and you will die.
Lie face down in the bath and don't raise your head to breathe - and you will die.

Seems that cars, OC scuba and bathtubs are not ready for "prime time" either by that logic.

No ECCR manufacturer would suggest flushing with Dil before ascent, no experienced ECCR diver would do so. I was just explaining why.
The fact that you could kill yourself by using the tool incorrectly doesn't in any way imply that the tool "is not ready for prime time". Suggesting as much just implies trolling.(Note" bolding added)

If you remove the word "and" then the logic fails, so the issue is not the actual task but rather the inappropriate response. All you arguments are basically foolish because they take the form: "If you do something, anything, and then kill yourself, you will die." A tautology, at best.

While the calculations are so trivial that any O/W diver should be able to do them, your assumptions are wrong, in at least two ways. First is the assumption that the diver will not make any further adjustments during a slow and methodical ascent after getting a read on the sensors (e.g., change the "and"). Second is that the diver can't get to the surface conscious, with a blow and go ESE if need be, also clearly wrong (again, change the "and"). If you are looking for ways to tack stupidity on reasonable procedure, there are many ways that you can do that, but post facto stupidity does not obviate the reasonableness of the initial response.

Your example requires that after flushing and determining the state of your sensors you tack on an "and" and do something completely unconnected: that is to say, ascend without enriching. The problem is not with a diluent flush at depth, which has all sorts of things to recommend it as a one-size-fits-all emergency first response, the problems that you're looking at stem from a theoretical subsequent error glued on with an "and". AND by-the-way ... when diving be sure you don't hold you breath as you ascend. Get the idea?

...
The only point I wanted to make was that many things can be dangerous if used incorrectly.
Rebreathers are not dangerous if used correctly.
The same can be said of the silverware on your dinner table.
And using one correctly includes understanding how to monitor their continued function, and work around occasional failures.
Agreed.
I've known people who have died on rebreathers. I've also known people who have died driving cars. In both cases, each of them died due to running out of talent, not because the rebreather or car stopped behaving as expected.
Everyone I know who has died in an automobile accident did so as a result of experiencing a chaotic break in the linearity of their universe (which sometimes was the result of their running out of talent, sometimes was the result of mechanical failure that no amount of talent could survive and sometimes was the result of being in the unpredictable path of someone else's chaotic side trip, to blame all of those on the former is a bit presumptuous and border on blaming every plane crash (or rebreather death) on pilot error. That's wishful thinking and engineer-style denial.
Use your (rebreather / car / OC gear / bathtub) correctly and you will be fine.

Mike
Keep dreaming, keep denying, that make give you confidence up till your last moment ... but it will not delay your last moment one iota.
 
Last edited:
No need to call people muppets, though. I find most non-CCR divers can't seem to visualize how an RB works because it's such an alarmingly simple concept. People want to make it difficult and it just isn't.

Sorry muppet comment was directed at the few who claim to be experts yet still refuse to grasp the simple concepts, not at you.
 
Got a bit distracted by all this flush / do not flush talk and may have missed some posts but have you seen this report on Deep Life?

www.deeplife.co.uk/or_files/RB_Fatal_Accident_Database_100725.xls

It has a list of RB accidents from 9th April 1949 to 4th September 2012.

The entry about Wes says:

Died during a photographic shoot for National Geographic on ultra fast photography. "Diving off the Boynton Inlet ( between West Palm Beach and Boca Raton ) on a private boat with two other divers. They were probably on the third reef but not confirmed, in 77 feet of water, run time at recovery was 103 minutes. Deceased signaled he was going up for more film after an hour of diving filming Goliath Groupers, one other diver went up shortly thereafter and didn't find Deceased on the surface, went back down and found him laying on the reef 25 minutes later. Taken to a local hospital in Palm Beach County, DOA. For the prior three days plus the day of the accident, Deceased was using a borrowed Dive Rite O2ptima. Prior to this four days of diving, Deceased is reported to have never dived an O2ptima and he was not formally trained on the O2ptima, but this is not confirmed because the Deceased has a feature page on the Dive-rite site as an apparent sponsored O2ptima user.
The O2ptima was not fitted with any on board bailout system (although normally supplied with one) and he was not carrying any off board bailout. Rebreather did not log PPO2, but Deceased had a Shearwater dive computer and the profile of that was available (and studied by this review team).
O2 sensors and Extendair cartridge were sent to NEDU (Navy Experimental Diving Unit) for testing. Tanks were sent to Lawrence Factor for analysis.
Three O2 sensors (AI PSR-11-39-MD) were tested for linearity, 2 of the three failed minimum voltage standards in room air. Range for AI Sensors is stated as 8.5 to 13 mV. The sensors came in at 7.9, 8.3, and 11.2 when tested in a temperature controlled hyperbaric chamber.
Tests on the used ExtendAir cartridge, with constant flow of 1.6L/min of CO2, showed that it was still capable of removing exhaled CO2 and would have supported life.
Tanks tested at Lawrence Factor showed that the O2 tank contained 99.7% O2 and all other measures within safe ranges, Diluent tank test was failed, apparently because it was empty and water had entered the tank. but during an ascent no DIL is required, so result not relevant. .
An autopsy found no indication of any causal health issue. Rebreather was operable after the accident.


The temporary nature of the cause, leaving no signs, points strongly to an hypoxia fault. The controllers use voting logic (a serious safety design fault), so with two sensors down then the voting logic would follow a faulty sensor. The data on the sensors shows only a marginal failure: only just under the 8.5mV limit. However, this error is not sufficient to cause hypoxia.
The dive profile was of particular interest. It includes a rapid ascent from 20m to 10m, then what appears to be instant LOC (hence hypoxia conclusion). The dive profile shows a depth excursion around 10 minutes before the ascent. The Optima has a design fault whereby the position of the injection point and the OPV is incorrect, so on a rapid ascent, as occurred here, all injected O2 is lost, and the displayed PPO2 may have no relation to that actually inhaled by the diver. The HH controller has a minimum PPO2 setting of 0.4 atm and the rebreather sets to that if reset. A reset on the depth excursion would fit the observed data. This accident therefore appears to involve an interaction between two design faults. Formal modelling is required to understand their individual significance.
 
Back
Top Bottom