I read them and I appreciate both of them taking the time to explain the issues involved.
Now I'm trying to wrap my head around why so many people with families willingly take on what appear to be the large additional risk factors of RB diving. Here's my thinking... Accident analysis normally uncovers a chain of decisions or events that led to the ultimate outcome. Changing any of these would have avoided the outcome. For OC fatalities, these chains almost always start before you enter the water with some combination of pre-existing health or condition issues, extremely poorly maintained or known-faulty equipment, lack of planning and/or knowingly entering conditions that greatly exceed your training. In other words, simply following the basic rules makes the sport extremely safe.
None of these seem to be factors here. Indeed, the accident chain appears distressingly short: a poor (but not completely unreasonable or fatal by itself) choice of bailout gas given the max depth and loss of contact with a buddy. As a father and husband, I would not partake of an activity where death is a not unusual outcome even if I do nearly everything right. This looks to me a bit like Himalayan expedition climbing on the spectrum of risk, where even the best and most prepared climbers have a non-negligible chance of dying every day on the mountain due to non-controllable factors.
I am not going to say that rebreather diving is safer than OC diving, it is not. But this mishap started well before entering water.
Diver had been not diving for several months, yet dive was planned and executed in challenging conditions.
Choice of gas was hardly adequate: wob in CCR mode is more critical the OC, so the diluent was 19/48 while the bailout was air.
They decided to dive in cold dark and limited visibility, all conditions that lead to narcosis.
Switched from helium warm humid mix to very cold, dry air.
So all of these conditions are easily seen in hindsight, but why the decision of the diver made sense at the time? What are the right antidotes to avoid making the same mistakes?
After the COVID lockdown I went for a dive, decided minimum/no deco same profile as the mishap dive, experienced buddy. We descended to 47 meters, turned the dive and ascended following the bottom of the lake, cold, dark and low viz.
We were lucky? Nothing did happen. What was the plan?
Plan was to come back already decompressed, we only had 5’ deco by the time we came up at 6mt and we would have followed the bottom in case of problem, as the mishap (appropriately, in my view and for the reason stated by others) team did. The only difference was we knew 2 things:
1 the whole dive there was an available guideline and we are cave trained solo divers, plan was to stay on the line;
2 at 39 mt there is a direct line anchored to a big boulder leading to a submerged buoy up to 3/4 meters.
So our plan had an escape route from almost maximum depth and it is well marked by a permanent guideline.
We had a risk assessment plan a contingency plan and an emergency plan. Was all of this well thought over in the mishap dive? Or was a dive in which they went through the moves of having a plan (remember wrong bailout gas for depth) but it was incorrectly planned?
When you deviate from procedures and you get away with it, or you become complacent and you do not pay the price for it, you deviate more and you become more complacent until you pay the ultimate price (normalization of deviance). Did ever the mishap divers bailed out to air at 45 meters? Did they know the effect?
In this case, probably, the dive was well within the capability of the divers when they were current and recent, within their training and capabilities. But, probably, a problem even when current and recent would have taxed their capabilities to solve it smoothly.
After a long hiatus from diving, probably this as a shakedown dive was a bit too much. Add the wrong gas for bailout and a minor problem (you feel disorientated because dark, cold and low viz and start doubting of you scrubber and bailout to the wrong gas) you are adding rings to the chain of events leading to the accident. Chain of events that started when you decided to dive, in that place, in those conditions, with those gases, with a profile including deco.
Are we realistic in evaluating our capabilities to handle issues underwater? How wide is our safety margin? Should we increase it after a period of inactivity? Are we accepting eccessive risks? How can we assess our risk?
I developed a risk assessment matrix, and a small article, which, I do not have here, it has been posted on the now defunct Technical Diving Magazine Issue 24 page 15.
I will dig it up and repost it. I do have the entire magazine and will try to attach it.
Edit: it worked. So with the information available try to fill the risk management matrix and see how it comes out in term of risk.
Cheers