REPORT RELEASED for double SCUBA fatality in California

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A lot of mistakes were made and it seems that rules and protocols were not followed. Lack of attention to detail caused two needless deaths. This is a problem from the top down. Many people to blame.
 
no lock out procedures, no coms, no stand-by Many things are wrong about this one...sad
See you topside! John
 
Un-freakin'-believable.

Who needs a instruction manual to figure out that it's a really bad idea to dive in the inlet of a giant-a$$ed pump?

Then, what kind of morons would wait for 1 1/2 hrs. to call 911? So many other "mistakes," too.
 
The first guy who had a chance to save their lives was the one who noticed the bubbles stop in front of pump 5. One call to the guy with the pump's emergency stop button most likely would've saved these guys. But he probably didn't have that number on account of him not having training on correct procedures. One call and one button.
 
A long list of "it's the procedure" or "it's not me it's him", sickening.

FWIW, a few years ago a commercial diver died in a similar situation in a power dam outlet owned by Hydro-Québec.

She was pinned down by water pressure but had surface supplied air. She died of hypothermia before they were able to pull her out.
 
This is a tragedy that could have been avoided. I may have missed the outline of the DWR safety protocols. What were they at the time of the accident? My understanding the "Dive Tender" is the acting safety officer. What role/authority does the Dive Tender have in the planning and follow through of the dive? Did the "fill-in" (nameless???) Dive Tender have any experience in this role? Why was there a delay contacting the divers (banging on the grates)? The contacting attempts took place 40-45 minutes after the bubbles were seen in front of grate 5. Was the Dive Tender to notify the divers as they approached grate 4? The report fails to answer many important questions. Does anyone know if any further action was taken in this tragedy?

A word about safety protocols... David R., my best friend growing up, began at Savannah River Site, as a Health and Safety Officer. He was responsible for giving the all clear for work to begin, as SRS is a nuclear processing facility. On a brutally hot summer day, he took his readings, inspected the work site, and informed the two welders they had to done their protective suits to enter the area. The younger welder complained and said it would only take 5-10 minutes to complete the job. David advised him that is not an option and he would not work without the suit. The welder begrudgingly donned his protective suit and climbed into the hole. Before he could begin the job there was a surge of water and the welders was dowsed with radioactive water. Thanks to safety protocols being adhered to the welders are alive and well today. Needles to say David was thanked.
 
Thanks TC for the update on this incident.
 
https://www.shearwater.com/products/teric/

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