Ever considered building upon such ideas instead of shutting them down? Have you ever given any thought about the alternatives and improvements?
Collective the community did in the late 90s and developed the current gas switch procedure. Which when adhered to has as far as I know resulted in 0 fatalities.
So I don’t waste time trying to solve problems that are already solved.
The current practice of labeling the tank and verifying the gas switch with multiple checks is the gold standard for a reason: it addresses the entire system, not just one piece. The steps involved—verifying the gas analysis tape, checking the permanently attached MOD label, performing a gas interruption check to ensure the regulator is connected to the tank you are switching to, and having a team verify all of this—create multiple layers of protection. These checks ensure that every switch is deliberate, verified, and backed by proper procedures. This process isn’t just about the individual component; it’s about making sure the entire system works together to prevent potentially fatal mistakes.
On the other hand, introducing a color-coding scheme might seem like a simple solution, but it introduces more risks than it solves. Color coding fails to account for the overall system and its complexities. It can lead to confusion and even a false sense of security. You can’t pick and choose single pieces of the system and say you’re doing human factors and claim you’re improving safety. True human factors engineering requires a holistic approach that considers the system in its entirety. Simplifying it down to color-coded gear actually increase the likelihood of failure.
The current practice—comprehensive and multi-layered—has been developed through years of learning, experience, and dead divers. It works because it ensures that every switch is verified through deliberate checks and cross-checks, not just relying on a visual marker that can fail.