Wesley Skiles' widow suing over rebreather

[Thalassamania]

Clearly, somehow his fO2 was down, further dropped on ascent, and he failed to detect and correct that. I had assumed that Wes was in a hurry and preoccupied with his camera. But the other "reasonable" explanation would be a sensor problem, compounded by other issues.

All photographers, no matter how good they are in the water, especially if they are on a CCR, will be assigned an unobtrusive nanny, er ... buddy, to watch out for them, that's SOP on all operations that I run. The buddy's primary function is not to go along for the ride so as to be in a position to rescue if need be, it is to see problems coming and head them off, often without the photographer ever even knowing it.

 

[Chris Brown Tech]

Why?

Maybe my penchant for being "hands on" is why I prefer to dive my CCR manually, rather than letting the electronics run it. I for one, would certainly not be interested in more safety systems. I take responsibility for my own mistakes, and by virtue, my own life.

I understand this for some people and situations, especially cave. I was originally trained on manuals too.

However, for videography, photography, documentaries etc, etc, FULL AUTOMATION is good idea IMO! (It has to be functional though of course.)

Although in this case, its seems obvious that the outcome would have been the same.

It was also a conclusion at RF3 that there was no evidence to suggest manual is safer than electronic or visa versa.

I agree with your car analogy but it doesnt make you safer. Aviation went through all this when automated flight systems came in. Pilots often cried "these new pilots have no idea - they never flew with analog instrumentation and manual controls" Yet the airlines and the military continue to automate as they can get their aircraft to perform more consistently and reliably.

 

[dumpsterDiver]

Clearly, somehow his fO2 was down, further dropped on ascent, and he failed to detect and correct that. I had assumed that Wes was in a hurry and preoccupied with his camera. But the other "reasonable" explanation would be a sensor problem, compounded by other issues.

All photographers, no matter how good they are in the water, especially if they are on a CCR, will be assigned an unobtrusive nanny, er ... buddy, to watch out for them, that's SOP on all operations that I run. The buddy's primary function is not to go along for the ride so as to be in a position to rescue if need be, it is to see problems coming and head them off, often without the photographer ever even knowing it.

I was told by his dive buddy that he had used up all the tape in the camera and had signaled he was ascending. He attempted to ascend alone.

If the camera is off and dead, I would assume that the camera itself would not present much of a distraction on the ascent.

 

[Crush]

I rather hope that after I die there are as many people out there who, "knew me very well," as Wes has developed since his passing.

Well put!

 

[Fish-R-Man]

I understand this for some people and situations, especially cave. I was originally trained on manuals too.

However, for videography, photography, documentaries etc, etc, FULL AUTOMATION is good idea IMO! (It has to be functional though of course.)

Although in this case, its seems obvious that the outcome would have been the same.

It was also a conclusion at RF3 that there was no evidence to suggest manual is safer than electronic or visa versa.

I agree with your car analogy but it doesnt make you safer. Aviation went through all this when automated flight systems came in. Pilots often cried "these new pilots have no idea - they never flew with analog instrumentation and manual controls" Yet the airlines and the military continue to automate as they can get their aircraft to perform more consistently and reliably.

I have spent most of my working career trying to improve the safety and reliability of the vessels that I work on. Most of it is through automation and monitoring. The one thing I have found during the years is that all of the automation that we have available to us is only as good as the guys that are monitoring and servicing that equipment. The biggest problem I have found is the more automated you become and the more you relay on that automation to monitor your equipment, the more that complacency sets in. You tend to stop doing the checks and balances that insures that everything is being monitored correctly.

As far as automation in the aircraft industry, the same thing applies. That's how you have two commercial pilots from Northwest, somehow over fly their destination airport by 150 miles like happened in Oct. 2009.

 

[robbcayman]

I have spent most of my working career trying to improve the safety and reliability of the vessels that I work on. Most of it is through automation and monitoring. The one thing I have found during the years is that all of the automation that we have available to us is only as good as the guys that are monitoring and servicing that equipment. The biggest problem I have found is the more automated you become and the more you relay on that automation to monitor your equipment, the more that complacency sets in. You tend to stop doing the checks and balances that insures that everything is being monitored correctly.

As far as automation in the aircraft industry, the same thing applies. That's how you have two commercial pilots from Northwest, somehow over fly their destination airport by 150 miles like happened in Oct. 2009.

I don't think anyone is suggesting putting your brain on auto pilot. I think you must remain vigilant, but offering more sensors and independent systems will likely reduce accidents. Oh well.. agree to disagree. I think we can all agree that the death of Wes is very tragic; I hope his wife gets some closure from all of this.

 

[Cave Diver]

I think you must remain vigilant, but offering more sensors and independent systems will likely reduce accidents.

That only helps if people pay attention to them. In several (most?) of the rebreather deaths I've seen reported, there were warning signs that were ignored.

 

[t-mac]

This is one of two things. Incredible grief and a need to assign blame (without first hand knowledge my guess) or a chance to win the lottery in court ( the American dream). Sad either way.

 

[Thalassamania]

Maybe its anger at things she has learned about the sensors and how that information was handled?

 

[padiscubapro]

I was good friends with Rob, and still feeel his loss, but the fact is that Rob was out of the water a long time prior to his accident, and was out of practice, couple this with some gear misassembly and you have a recipe for disaster.

"Operator error" should be engineered out of the process.



Failures on OC are inherently obvious (the diver stops breathing). The diver then knows that it's time to share air or "go up".

Failures on a rebreather are not always obvious.



Rob Davie (a deceased rebreather diver, instructor and commercial jet pilot), and the guy who died in the pool, and probably Wes, would all disagree with you.



I'm not looking for a ban, I'm looking for better rebreathers.

flots.

---------- Post Merged at 09:57 AM ---------- Previous Post was at 09:04 AM ----------

Clearly, somehow his fO2 was down, further dropped on ascent, and he failed to detect and correct that. I had assumed that Wes was in a hurry and preoccupied with his camera. But the other "reasonable" explanation would be a sensor problem, compounded by other issues.

.

there is no clear indication that his fo2 was low..