Seems different to me. Sure if you can show evidence of innocence, cool, but it's not a requirement in a bail hearing to my knowledge. In fact, if you google bail evidence of innocence, this thread is #4 on the list...
You seemed to have missed my point. I didn't bring this up for the case itself, but for the discussion of law that it contains.
Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of the People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe, Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order dated February 23, 1946, denying the application for bail. Hence, this petition for certiorari, predicated upon the theory that no proof having been presented by the special prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail.
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.
And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States according to authorities to be quoted later. In some states of the American union, the burden of showing that proof is evident or the presumption great, lies on the prosecution while in others on the petitioner, but the rule seems to be uniform to the effect that no matter which side bears the burden of proof, the evidence of guilt should be adduced before the court for a proper determination of its probative force. In American Jurisprudence the following appears:
. . . The English rule is, however, by no means uniformly followed in the United States. In some jurisdictions the case is heard de novo, the solicitor and prosecutor are notified to attend, and witnesses are subpoenaed both for the state and for the defendant and are examined before the court. This practice seems generally to be followed, and it may be laid down as abroad principle that where bail is not a matter of right, the burden is upon the petitioner to produce facts sufficient to entitle him to bail at the hearing. He is therefore both required and permitted to introduce evidence doing to the merits of the case against him. Ordinarily, the presumption is with the state, and it is proper to require the prisoner to introduce evidence in the first instance, although it imposes upon him the necessity of producing evidence upon which the state intends to rely for his conviction on the final trial. the accused will not, by this procedure, be denied the opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses. However, in some jurisdictions, the courts have gone so far as to hold that the duty is upon the prosecuting attorney, in resisting an application, to begin the proceedings by the introduction of evidence showing that the applicant is not entitled to bail. (6 Am. Jur., section 47, p. 70.).
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The general rule followed in the United States is more liberal than that of the common law, and the mere fact that a grand jury has found an indictment for murder will not generally preclude the court from inquiry into the facts of the case. On this inquiry the witnesses for the prosecution may be called, and the accused is not required to produce the testimony of any other witnesses. Furthermore, the accused is entitled to go behind the indictment and introduce evidence going to the merits of the case. The inquiry should not be limited to determining the probable degree of the homicide, but should include the determination of the character of the proof or the strength of the presumption respecting whether or not the defendant did the killing or was connected with it as a guilty agent. A case for the allowance of bail after indictment may also be presented where the public prosecutor admits that under the evidence obtainable no conviction of a capital offense can be had, or where there has been a failure to convict, or where a verdict of guilty has been reversed by reason of the insufficiency of the evidence. (6 Am. Jur., section 50, p. 71.)