Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

[rjack321]

I did for 20 years. As a boat owner. As do almost every boat in the liveaboard fleet, considering a good many are former GOM crewboats. This one was not, but accepted practice is accepted practice, and the hatch exactly followed regulations.

The hatch was clearly inadequate for the number of people expecting to exit within a reasonable time in the dark of night. Could you see a new/revised requirement for egress to be timed? ie all passengers in a compartment being able to exit within 2 mins or something like that?

 

[SomeGuy509]

I work in aerospace, not marine engineering so this may sound dumb. As has been mentioned for a new plane you have run cert tests with actual people to validate that exits work as designed.

Is any sort of testing like that required for ships? Is there a break point (displacement, capacity, length?) where it goes from requiring a real world test to certification based on following the regs and other substantiation work?

 

[rjack321]

If they do such a thorough job as to be able to find a crack in an extinguisher hose, I would love to see documentation on specific tests they conducted in order to ensure that the above-mentioned hatch complied with the following requirements:

(d) The number and dimensions of the means of escape from each space must be sufficient for rapid evacuation in an emergency for the number of persons served.
(e) The dimensions of a means of escape must be such as to allow easy movement of persons when wearing life jackets.
(m) Footholds, handholds, ladders, and similar means provided to aid escape, must be suitable for use in emergency conditions.

Rapid is not defined - but I can imagine it might be after this accident.

The same language is used for the donning of lifejackets. The few times I have been boarded locally myself (my vessel is uninspected) myself and all passengers had to don lifejackets in 30seconds. This was the prerogative of the boarding officer - it seems reasonable to me considering how many life jackets get stowed in cabinets or tucked into inaccessible spaces.

 

[runsongas]

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someone from another forum pointed out the escape hatch is actually seen here:
View attachment 538442

that hatch is to the engine room, not to the bunk room. the hatch to the bunk room is further forward in the salon.

 

[ChrisM]

someone from another forum pointed out the escape hatch is actually seen here:
View attachment 538442

There is another post above showing a pic with the hatch daylighting under the center table in the salon. I have only been on the truth and vision but one is configured the same, is that the hatch on top of the center console on the dive deck with "Keep Clear" stenciled on it? I do recall that scenario

ETA - never mine - see the above re hatch to the engine room. I suppose one thing you could say is that the bunk hatch isn't likely to have heavy dive gear ending up on top of it

The hatch issue does bother me and I accept it's within regs. Begs the question whether regs are adequate, I think they are for a "day to day" emergency (if such a thing exists) but perhaps not something as catastrophic as this. Not speculating, but if it occurred as I think it did (not the cause but the prevention of escape), I am not sure that even a second stairwell aft would have helped.

I would also think boats could improve that access by eliminating those bunks and providing a ladder. Speaking generally

 

[happy-diver]

I may pay heed to any one of these posts if any one of these posts
rallied 100% support for the surviving crew, who will suffer forever

 

[Louisville Diver]

I don't know why you keep saying this. There is no indication that the boat was bot following regulations, and I would know, as I had a similar boat doing similar things for 20 years. I can quote chapter and verse of the applicable regulations, and there is no reason to think that there was a wink and a nod to any of them.

Nothing about that exit setup meets the standards of 46 CFR §177.500 et seq. It isn't clear enough, marked enough, traversible enough or even large enough. A couple of somebodies did a gigantic wrong, and 34 people died as a result.

 

[Scuba-74]

Rapid is not defined - but I can imagine it might be after this accident.

The same language is used for the donning of lifejackets. The few times I have been boarded locally myself (my vessel is uninspected) myself and all passengers had to don lifejackets in 30seconds. This was the prerogative of the boarding officer - it seems reasonable to me considering how many life jackets get stowed in cabinets or tucked into inaccessible spaces.

True, "rapid" is not defined, and neither is "easy". But I believe in a case like this the certifying officer could and should be at the very least questioned (if not held accountable) on the arbitrary thresholds they used in conducting these tests.

 

[roakey]

Haven’t posted here in years, but since I dove the Conception a lot in the 90s, the latest in 2000 I figured I come in here and see the discussion. Started reading when the thread was 39 pages long, finished when it was 47. Up to 51 by the time I finished composing this reply. So, I might as well add my voice to the noise.

My bunk, ALWAYS, was 10U. 10U and 27U are the escape hatch bunks. The hatch is between them, making 10U and 27U the only bunks with an opening between them. So I can speak to the egress there, having opened it up and looked around.

The “cabinet” that everyone is calling a death trap is actually a good idea. You don’t want a hatch in the middle of an open floor because stuff could be put on top of it or in the case of an evacuation where the staircase could also be used, people would be walking on top of it to exit, keeping it closed (or falling into it, if already open). The open “cabinet” (note there is no door on it) kept it free of stuff being put down on it and completely eliminated the possibility of anyone standing on it or falling into it. The three closed sides forced you to face directly towards the exit from the dining room, assuring no one went the wrong way if visibility was limited because of smoke, for instance. Armchair quarterbacks aside, the “cabinet” was a good idea.

The only way that no one would have escaped is if the entire dining area was ablaze by the time it was detected. Given the unfortunate outcome, I have no doubt that this was the case, so my biggest question is what went up so fast in the dining area? I admit that I fall into the Li-ION battery camp of guesses.

The bridge, which has all but one crew bunk, is above the dining area, so it would have become uninhabitable very quickly as well in a fast-spreading dining room fire. The other crew bunk is down below with the paying customers - this is the only crew member they lost. So in theory there was a crew member present that could direct the evacuation on the deck below - if it was possible.

Given that the bunks were pretty full, it’s likely that someone was in 10U or 27U or if not, at least one person in a nearby bunk would have the presence of mind to be able to use the escape hatch - if they could have. Since the bunk area is 100% below the dining room, I’m not sure if escape routes the size of ballroom staircases would have helped - my guess the entire boat above the bunks was a conflagration by the time the first person below was aware that there was a problem.

As for all the boats like this being deathtraps, well yes and no. A fact of life (death?) is that human life has a dollar amount associated with it. Dive boats like the Conception meet all the safety requirements; and those requirements are based on most likely scenarios. Being hulled and requiring evacuation is a likely scenario. A fire in the galley or a fire in the engine room are likely scenarios. A fast, swift moving conflagration of a bunch of tables and chairs in a fairly open-air space is not. I really hope the root cause is found because THAT’S the first problem that needs to be found and fixed.

So is that small, rear escape hatch sufficient for the most likely scenarios? I don’t know, it very well could be. But that’s the second question. The first is what caused the fire and what caused it to spread so quickly. And if that issue can be eliminated, perhaps the hatch is a sufficient solution to the most likely problems.

And maybe not.

Roak

 

[Ravenware]

Nobody is talking about handholding while you dive, and if you want to live like you're in a grubby Amsterdam hostel when you dive, nobody is taking that away from you either. We are talking about pretty basic standards of safety involving you not drowning when your boat sinks and not burning to death when the whole thing goes up in a conflagration.

As for insurance, I doubt that they've got any more than a $5 mil umbrella. This outfit is done; they may as well start their liquidation and personal bankruptcies now.

You have no idea what you are talking about. This operation runs weekend dive boats, never far from land, to get you to dive sites that can only be gotten to by boat. 2 nights, 2 days of diving. The price I paid, $550 for 2 nights and 2 days isn’t exactly cheap. Truth Aquatics has been around for a long time. They have hosted over 1 million dives, and 450,000 divers have been on their boats. They are not a fly by night organization. Please stop bad mouthing them when you don’t know what actually happened.

I have been on this boat. Clean, well maintained, good crew, good food, excellent diving. This trip was a three day trip because of Labor Day. Based on my personal experience on this boat, I think the findings will show the fire started possibly from a lith battery exploding and the fire spread very fast. The staircase is not narrow, nor is it a ladder, it was a staircase that fed directly into the galley, as did the escape hatch. The only way passengers were trapped is the galley was fully engulfed and prevented escape from either the stairs or the hatch.

There will certainly be changes to boat charters, but I sincerely hope Glen and his family do not go out of business, and I will do whatever I can to help them stay around.

Karen