Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

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Good question.

Does anyone know if a boat such as this would be required to have a night watch while folks slept?
Yes. There is required to be a captain or mate awake at all times.
 
Are you saying that the "escape hatch" didn't lead outside, but instead led to another cabinet from which they then had do escape? If this is true, that's madness!

An escape hatch does not need to lead to the outside. Just to another another compartment. As such, on these boats, the hatch comes out at the entrance of the dinning area. Which is right by the doors leading outside. So no madness but how vessels are built. Frank can add more details.
 
yes, but generally and almost in all situations, the bilge pumps have less capacity than the fire pumps.
On some vessels (less than 65), the bilge pump and fire pump are the same pump. On Spree, the bilge pump backed up the fire pump and vice versa, the difference being that the fire pump must be self priming.
 
Not to mention like @rjack321 said, fill a boat full of Halon and the fire's out, but everyone's still dead.....

That being said, I think lots of boat owners are going to reevaluate their charging procedures regardless of whether or not it is linked to the cause of this fire. A quick flip stainless table that immediately dumps the contents over the side is probably a pretty good idea.
A total flooding system with CO2 or Nitrogen will kill everyone in the room who can't rapidly escape when it discharges.

FM-200 and similar gas systems are designed to be safe enough that should be able to breath and make your way out. But they are bulky, very expensive, require yearly service and require a sealed room to work. I don't believe they are allowed to protect somewhere people sleep, thought you can get exemptions to most of these rules if you can make a good case and have data.

Various gasious agents will apparently shut down a LI battery fire, in a high enough concentration, one somewhat above the typical 7% of FM-200.
 
Someone posted the regulations earlier, but to summarize, you must not have an escape path through a watertight bulkhead. This is a fight I had with the Coast Guard for many years, and eventually I installed a $30,000 door that met the regulations.

This is exactly how it was on Spree. My new boat has the hatch from the berthing area out to the main deck behind the anchor windlass. But it can (as the conspiracy theorists say) be locked.

Does working as a contract vessel for the .mil/.gov types change any of the regulations you have to abide by, or is it a civilian vessel under the scope of the USCG regardless of who's taking it to sea?
 
An escape hatch does not need to lead to the outside. Just to another another compartment. As such, on these boats, the hatch comes out at the entrance of the dinning area. Which is right by the doors leading outside. So no madness but how vessels are built.

Which is great unless the galley is consumed by flames.
 
Does working as a contract vessel for the .mil/.gov types change any of the regulations you have to abide by, or is it a civilian vessel under the scope of the USCG regardless of who's taking it to sea?
NOAA/NAVY/National Park Service required we be inspected to current applicable standards.

Edited to add, since we were an inspected vessel, we were exempted from other rules. For instance, I had a disgruntled employee file a complaint against us for having a substandard galley. Another overnight fishing head boat had the same issue at the same time. The specific complaint is that I didn't have a 3 section sink (wash, rinse, rinse again) as commercial kitchens are required. When the county health inspector showed up, she was quite upset, and I mentioned that we didn;t serve meals in the county. She said what? I said "we don't serve meals in Monroe County, how can you regulate us?" She checked with her boss and lo and behold, we were good with our Coast Guard (including having all of the crew certified as Food Handlers) and she went away.

The state lady was harder, but I still prevailed.
 
FM-200 and similar gas systems are designed to be safe enough that should be able to breath and make your way out. But they are bulky, very expensive, require yearly service and require a sealed room to work. I don't believe they are allowed to protect somewhere people sleep, thought you can get exemptions to most of these rules if you can make a good case and have data.

Various gasious agents will apparently shut down a LI battery fire, in a high enough concentration, one somewhat above the typical 7% of FM-200.
Having the room sealed for the required time (10 or 15mins in NPFA I think?) and being able to exit are unfortunately contradictory.
 
On some vessels (less than 65), the bilge pump and fire pump are the same pump. On Spree, the bilge pump backed up the fire pump and vice versa, the difference being that the fire pump must be self priming.
thanks, only sailed larger vessels that had separate systems.. and given the bilge on a couple of them, that is the LAST thing I would want to pump onto a fire. One ship I sailed in had a bilge fire from a turbine that caught fire and dripped flaming fuel.. the whole bilge went up for a wee bit..
 
This thread has made me both remember, and appreciate, my recent trip on the Nautilus Explorer to the Revillagigedos. Up to 17 passengers are located in 9 cabins below deck. The other 8 passengers are on the wheelhouse deck. The main exit from below deck is a stairway at one end that exits onto the covered dive deck. The emergency hatch exit was at my end of the hall, accessed by a sturdy ladder, and exited into the dining room. Both exits and the alarms and emergency lighting were pointed out during the safety briefing. All passengers were required to retrieve their PFD, don it correctly and gather at the muster site on the dive deck. At least 3 passengers were required to put on their PFD again so that it was done properly. I did not necessarily appreciate this at the time.

The crew held a fire fighting drill one afternoon that did not include the passengers. Other crew members helped 2 of the crew quickly don fire fighting attire and breathing apparatus. They then deployed hoses and other fire fighting equipment. This equipment was all stored in a closet on the dive deck adjacent to the stairway from below deck and the exit door from the salon. The exercise was timed. I asked one of the crew about the exercise and he simply said they perform the drill once each sail, just in case. I did not necessarily appreciate this at the time either.

I have never paid very much attention to safety considerations when choosing a liveaboard, I believe that has changed now. I was already considering a return trip to the Revillagigedos on the Explorer, mostly because it was such a great trip with a fantastic crew. That return trip has now moved even further up my list. The fire on the Conception has scared the complacency, and other things, out of me


My husband and I were on the Nautilus Explorer several years ago on a trip to Guadalupe Island for a Great White Shark trip and I also remember and was impressed by the mandatory PFD/evacuation drill for passengers and the fire fighting drill completed during the trip by the crew. We were discussing this horrific Conception tragedy last night and we remembered that of all the liveaboards we have been on over the years, the ONLY time we were required to participate in a mandatory PFD/evacuation drill or see the crew practice a fire drill was onboard the Nautilus Explorer.
 
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