Fire on dive boat Conception in CA

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Thanks, so without info to contradict the idea, we can assume a crew member was awake when the fire started. We also seem to have established that there was very little or no potential for explosive gases (like propane or gasoline) or even pure oxygen inside the vessel.

So we don’t suspect the fire started with an explosion, but there may have been subsequent ones much later as the vessel burned up.

So where do we suspect the watch officer was located at the start of the fire?

It is my understanding there are 3 decks, the births in the bottom, the galley above that and then a third cabin above the galley where the wheelhouse and crews quarters are situated?

Is that the general lay out?

If the fire started in the lowest deck, is it reasonable to suspect that it could get bad before a crew member located 2 floors above might notice smoke or something? Would a
Smoke detector alarm be audible from two floors above?

I’m not suggesting anything, just trying to better understand the basic parameters of the situation as best we can.

I’ve seen rather small electrical problems on boats make some smoke, but the fumes and the odor is pretty overpowering in a tight space, and this doesn’t require any type of significant fire.

Can we assume an electrical fire of significant proportion could generate lethal fumes or ones that might incapacitate sleeping victims , before an out of control fire even occurs??
This is what I am assuming happened, Fire started down below, disabled everyone there, and then broke up to the galley. I'm probably wrong.
 
If you had, you probably would not have made this post.

No, not probably, definitely would not made that post. I was certain however if I was wrong someone would notice and help me out.
 
Under perfect conditions, starting in their bunks, I don't think that all ~33 people could get out through this escape hatch in under 3-4 minutes, . Add to the situation, some might have been overweight and out of shape and others might not have the strength to pull themselves out by themselves and you get some would not get out period, without assistance.

AT 3 a.m., I'm not sure you can even get 34+ folks up the staircase in 3 minutes. Especially if only emergency lights or none.

It would be pandemonium and folks are half-asleep, panicked, or somewhere in between. Some may have even taken sleep aids. (After this incident, sleep aids are plainly a really BAD idea.) If you have a crew member to give orders, that would help. And just like on airplane emergencies, some will probably be grabbing their personal items.

One relatively straightforward response to this would be to add a night watch crewmember who is designated solely to walk the main deck, and otherwise stay in the salon. Even if the crewmember dozes off, I expect he/she would be woken pretty quickly by a fire in the salon. If something bad happens, that crewmember raises the alarm and goes down to the sleeping berths to commence the evac.

edit: any updates on whether the final missing soul has been located?
 
Haveing gone out on the Conception and other Truth boats and other SoCal live abords, I never saw any propane. The galley was electric and the BBQ on the back deck was electric.

There was no banked gas, the compressor was fed from a membrane system directly to the SCUBA tanks. The tanks were all on the back deck, where one sits on a bench to gear up. It was all Nitrox 32. Sometimes divers brought O2 bottles, however it was rare in my experience as most diving was NDL.

The fire was not on the back deck untill it came out of the cabin, from what I could see on the films.

My bets are on batteries, or from @Wookie, in a wire run untill it broke out. Possibly from the draw of battery charging.

My 2 cents.



Bob

That back deck is also where the second hatch is located?
 
Is ASTM F1166 a consideration on this size of vessel?

ASTM F1166: Standard Practice for Human Engineering Design for Marine Systems, Equipment, and Facilities

I ask because I have never worked on a vessel this small. ASTM are not like CFR’s (Codes of Federal Regulations). I assume the ASTM would have to be invoked by a CFR (to be a USCG requirement). Or invoked by ABS (American Bureau of Shipping)standards, if this was an ABS certified vessel. It is probably not an ABS vessel.


When I see the picture below of the alternate escape route, I cringe. To me this violates section 18.9.3 of ASTM F1166 (and several other sections describing minimum requirements for a proper escape route).





I notice a lot of talk about the escape hatch, but the entire escape route has to be treated as a system.

My concerns were probably not critical in this situation since both escape routes ended in the same space.

Note: I normally work on Navy vessels were Mil-Std-1472 (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD, HUMAN ENGINEERING), but I have worked on a few vessels were the ASTM F1166 is the guiding document for human engineering. I have also worked some in the area of Damage Control (DC) and when I have asked on LOB vessel what did they have for fire suppression plan or progressive flooding mitigation plan it always bothered me the blank stares I got from some of the crew.

I am just asking since I don’t know much about regulations on this types of vessels.




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This vessel was not classed ABS. I've never heard of a dive boat, or small passenger boat that was classed ABS. Mine was load line only, and that was $400,000, and was one of the first SPV's to be retrofitted for ABS, although there are some that had had GM, and the only Swiftships to be done.

The CG could invoke ASTM if they desired, they do invoke other federal regulations for other things, ex. OSHA for commercial diving outside of state waters. In this case they do not.
 
Is ASTM F1166 a consideration on this size of vessel?

ASTM F1166: Standard Practice for Human Engineering Design for Marine Systems, Equipment, and Facilities

I ask because I have never worked on a vessel this small. ASTM are not like CFR’s (Codes of Federal Regulations). I assume the ASTM would have to be invoked by a CFR (to be a USCG requirement). Or invoked by ABS (American Bureau of Shipping)standards, if this was an ABS certified vessel. It is probably not an ABS vessel.


When I see the picture below of the alternate escape route, I cringe. To me this violates section 18.9.3 of ASTM F1166 (and several other sections describing minimum requirements for a proper escape route).





I notice a lot of talk about the escape hatch, but the entire escape route has to be treated as a system.

My concerns were probably not critical in this situation since both escape routes ended in the same space.

Note: I normally work on Navy vessels were Mil-Std-1472 (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD, HUMAN ENGINEERING), but I have worked on a few vessels were the ASTM F1166 is the guiding document for human engineering. I have also worked some in the area of Damage Control (DC) and when I have asked on LOB vessel what did they have for fire suppression plan or progressive flooding mitigation plan it always bothered me the blank stares I got from some of the crew.

I am just asking since I don’t know much about regulations on this types of vessels.




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That's the first photo that I've seen that shows any kind of marking at all.
 
Good points, but since advances in safety codes often come from tragedy analysis, let me ask you this.

If the bunks under the hatch had been removed and replaced with a simple ladder, flanked by emergency internally powered illumination and/or luminous paint (like on aircraft), wouldn't that (1) significantly improve egress, and (2) not involve any significant construction costs, redesign or new flooding risks? The only downside of that that I can see would be the loss of revenue for those three bunks.

I'm not saying that the operator didn't run a great boat, with full adherence to existing safety standards. I'm not blaming the crew or the naval architect or the inspector or anyone else. Sounds like everything was in full compliance. And of course, it is impossible to mitigate every conceivable risk.

But doing that seems like a pretty straightforward and simple upgrade. As Frank said, he reduced the carriage rate on the Spree to make it safer, so I can't believe that the charter business wouldn't work without those three bunks. So maybe that could be one change in regulations that would help without a lot of downside.

Again, I know very little about this stuff, just trying to read and learn. PS I charge my can light battery on the stove at home.
Since it appears nobody got out the hatch, the ease of getting out the hatch probably was not the problem. If part of the people got out but some couldn't, then the hatch accessibility would more likely be an issue.
 
You always should collect all the evidence as if there is going to be a murder trial. Because you won't know what happened for a while and trying to collect evidence months later doesn't work well.

I understand from the investigative standpoint why you keep that possibility in mind. What I am talking about is the tendency of peope to keep saying that something criminal or grossly negligent must have happened in this case when they don't make that assumption about a bus crash for instance. It's just odd to me that people have gone right to that - particularly in regards to the crew. As if it is impossible that it could just be a horrific and catastrophic event.
 
I hate to even speculate a little on this before more information is released, but for those who have stayed on the boat, are the cabins lockable from the outside?
I find it odd yet obviously terrible that not a single person made it out, especially those nearest the exits. Alarms would have gone off, at least one person would have smelled the smoke and been awake. I don't think possibility of foul play should be ignored.
There are no cabins. They are bunks with curtains. No door at the top of stairs, goes directly into dining area.
 
Not quite, almost.


§ 181.405 Spaces required to have fire detection systems.
(a) The following spaces must be equipped with a fire detection and alarm system of an approved type installed in accordance with 46 CFR part 76, except when a fixed-gas fire extinguishing system that is capable of automatic discharge upon heat detection is installed or when the space is manned:

(1) A space containing propulsion machinery.

(2) A space containing an internal combustion engine of more than 50 hp.

(3) A space containing an oil-fired boiler.

(4) A space containing machinery powered by gasoline or any other fuels having a flash point of 43.3 °C (110 °F) or lower.

(5) A space containing a fuel tank for gasoline or any other fuel having a flash point of 43.3 °C (110 °F) or lower.

(b) All griddles, broilers, and deep fat fryers must be fitted with a grease extraction hood in compliance with § 181.425.

(c) Each overnight accommodation space on a vessel with overnight accommodations for passengers must be fitted with an independent modular smoke detection and alarm unit in compliance with § 181.450.

(d) An enclosed vehicle space must be fitted with an automatic sprinkler system that meets the requirements of 46 CFR part 76 and a fire detection and alarm system of an approved type that is installed in accordance with 46 CFR part 76.

(e) A partially enclosed vehicle space must be fitted with a manual sprinkler system that meets the requirements of 46 CFR part 76.

§ 181.450 Independent modular smoke detecting units.
(a) An independent modular smoke detecting unit must:

(1) Meet UL 217 (incorporated by reference, see 46 CFR 175.600) and be listed as a “Single Station Smoke detector - Also suitable for use in Recreational Vehicles,” or other standard specified by the Commandant;

(2) Contain an independent power source; and

(3) Alarm on low power.

So it doesn't need to be supervised, or alarm remotely.
true, should have said "think RV", I knew that but didn't recall while posting, then again this stuff is far back in my memory banks while it's still your day.

I meant to type does NOT have to be remote... that is what I was thinking as I typed anyhow..
 
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