DevonDiver
N/A
The article more than implies that the fatality was caused by a regulator unsuitable for cold water diving. That suggests a 1st stage freeflow at depth as the triggering factor.
Freeflow regulator breathing is an Open Water level skill.
It's important to recognize that whilst the freeflow was a trigger; an inability to perform entry-level competencies formed the link in the accident chain that led to a fatality.
A second link in that accident chain is the opportunity to air-share. With 12 divers in the group, there was ample opportunity for someone to provide assistance and air to the diver with complications. An air-sharing ascent would have averted the catastrophe, irrespective of the free-flow. This was not successfully performed (attempted?) by any of the divers present.
Contingency/emergency skills are meant to mitigate against such forseeable incidents turning into accidents where injury or death occur.
Insufficient training at the onset, coupled with insufficient maintenance of critical emergency skills is... I believe...the major issue to be highlighted.
Put simply, recreational divers should not die from freeflow events.
Other factors worth considering is the training/experience level of the participant group divers versus the level of supervision. The OP mentions a group size of 12 with a (singular?) leader. A single dive leader could not be expected to safely and sufficiently supervise and/or intervene with that size of group, especially in low visibility. That points to flawed dive leadership.
There's been no mention of the certification/training/experience levels of those involved - but the fact that one diver was unable to deal with a freeflow, provoking two other divers into rapid ascents.... hints towards a very inexperienced and/or under-trained group.