I finally got time to read Sealab. It is of particular interest because I was stationed on the Elk River in 1971 and a few Sealab vets were still at Submarine Development Group I. This book, talking with these men, and knowing the support system it reinforces my belief that Sealab III was doomed to failure. Not that these people weren't fully capable of figuring it out. We were still figuring a lot out and inventing critical parts years after Cannon's death -- without the dramatically added complexity of the Sealab habitat itself.
To a man, none of the Sealab vets I spoke with believed that Paul Wells was to blame for Cannon's death. The Mark VI and IX semiclosed rebreathers were pretty pathetic even to a young sailor like me. An empty CO
2 absorbent canister would have actually been safer because the breathing resistance was crazy-high and Baralyme is very inefficient at that temperature.
I was told that enough gas was consumed in the very short time Cannon and Barth were locked out that they could have been on open circuit demand in a Kirby-Morgan Band Mask with voice communications, which they didn't have. Consumption was so high because they had to ride their bypass valve so often in order to prevent blackout... on all five lockouts during two bell/PTC runs. Of course the fact that they may as well have been in bathing suits because the hot water to the suits and electric bell heater didn't work was enough to quadruple gas consumption... and cause all but the most extraordinary humans to pass out from hypothermia.
We now know that even if the hot water system performed perfectly in the habitat, which it probably would have, they would all have pneumonia within a day or two due to respiratory heat loss. Nobody knew you needed heated breathing gas below about 500'. In hind sight, a third-year engineering student could have done the calcs if there was any reason to suspect it.
A drive to pioneer, a complex confluence of opportunities, ignorance of yet-to-be discovered methods, and a small amount of well-intentioned politics caused the death. Given more time and money, which they could have gotten but few realized, they would have concluded that underwater habitats were the wrong tool for the job after Sealab II.
Barry Cannon.s legacy was a much more measured approach to saturation diving development and saved a lot of lives. Even with all that, I understand. I would have given a limb to have been on that project.
If you like this book you would also enjoy
Papa Topside: The Sealab Chronicles of Capt. George F. Bond
