Horizon Dive Adventures Complaint Filed in Federal Court

[Wookie]

Case 4:17-cv-10050-JLK

Document 19 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/06/2017

PETITIONER HORIZON DIVE ADVENTURES, INC’S OBJECTION, ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTER CLAIM TO CLAIMS OF PETER SOTIS ​

While an old filing - 06SEP2017 - Doc 19 (excerpted above) is an interesting read when taken in its entirety. The third affirmative defense - no surprise there.

What's happened since September?

Not much - attorney jumped in and Rule 26 disclosures. The disclosures shed light on the folks and the 'stuff' that will be at the big party.​

Rule 26 - Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Lots more to come ...

I'm not a lawyer nor do I stay at Holiday Inns much, but I thought Rule 26 disclosures were supposed to be complete, listing everything discoverable about the rebreather, including who was on the team who discovered the rebreather and the condition of the rebreather when it was discovered? I mean, if Horizon's counsel is going to point at rEvo, 3 fingers point back...

 

[2charliediver]

Steve C, how would the design of a piece of dive gear allow four successful dives to that depth over two days then fail on the last one? The design, as I understand it, is CE tested, right?

 

[Steve_C]

Steve C, how would the design of a piece of dive gear allow four successful dives to that depth over two days then fail on the last one? The design, as I understand it, is CE tested, right?

In the same way that a stairs with a defective stair rail design can be climbed many times until somebody puts a little pressure on it.

The impression I have is that the final dive was different and the divers, at least one of them, returned to the surface in what could be called an emergency situation and got on the boat. The other diver in some manner flooded his unit and sank from sight. Whether that was due to he also being in trouble, or overlooking something in the stress of the moment, I have no idea. But one can argue that the ability to flood in what could be considered a normal emergency situation could be an indicator of poor design.

In other areas the ability to easily flip the wrong switch is not considered good controller design.

 

[2charliediver]

Steve I get the impression you are unfamiliar with rebreathers in general and in this unit in particular. The things you speak of are covered in the first most basic rebreather course. There are no switches to flip in the control design that you speak of. You should have more information if you are going to comment on a subject that it seems you know little about

 

[Steve_C]

Steve I get the impression you are unfamiliar with rebreathers in general and in this unit in particular. The things you speak of are covered in the first most basic rebreather course. There are no switches to flip in the control design that you speak of. You should have more information if you are going to comment on a subject that it seems you know little about

I make no claims of personal knowledge of rebreathers. I do have a lot of experience with examining the logic of arguments. My mention of switches was not about rebreathers but was an analogy in response to a statement that because several dives had been completed therefore the unit must have been fine. A mechanical device can have a design weakness that allows it to function fine a number of times but then under certain circumstances to either fail or make it easier for a wrong choice to be made. This design weakness, if known to the manufacturers can still lead them to have some liability if things go wrong. I am not saying that there was a design weakness. Just that the successful dives did not prove there was not a design weakness.

 

[2charliediver]

Ok Steve, whatever you say.

 

[cathal]

I make no claims of personal knowledge of rebreathers. I do have a lot of experience with examining the logic of arguments. My mention of switches was not about rebreathers but was an analogy in response to a statement that because several dives had been completed therefore the unit must have been fine. A mechanical device can have a design weakness that allows it to function fine a number of times but then under certain circumstances to either fail or make it easier for a wrong choice to be made. This design weakness, if known to the manufacturers can still lead them to have some liability if things go wrong. I am not saying that there was a design weakness. Just that the successful dives did not prove there was not a design weakness.

Would love to hear whats an acceptable level of probability of failure in your view Steve? 1 in 1000? 1 in 10,000? 1 in 1,000,000??

Cathal

 

[Steve_C]

Would love to hear whats an acceptable level of probability of failure in your view Steve? 1 in 1000? 1 in 10,000? 1 in 1,000,000??

Cathal

Depends on the units:
rebreathers? hours of operation? minutes of operation? Number of dives?

Legally it can depend more on if it is foreseeable and avoidable.

Absence of a handrail that could have prevented a fall is a source of liability even if thousands walked by without needing a handrail and we are all trained to not walk off high platforms.

 

[cathal]

Depends on the units:
rebreathers? hours of operation? minutes of operation? Number of dives?

Legally it can depend more on if it is foreseeable and avoidable.

That's the question, what is in your view an acceptable probability of failure on a CCR for any rebreather be it in units, hours or dives etc. What do you think it is. And please note failure does not include user error. I only am referring to rebreather components failing.

Cathal

 

[The Chairman]

Well I guess that's true since he was in the water.

I truly see their point. In fact, I agree with it. Once you leave the taxi, they are not responsible for your safety, even if they wait for your return.