ValuJet Flight 592 took off from Miami runway 09L at 14:04 for a flight to Atlanta. At 14:10, while flying at 10628 feet at 232 knots IAS (heading 300 ) the altitude dropped 815 feet and the IAS decreased 34 knots in 3 seconds time. From then on, the FDR recorded intermittent data dropouts. Shortly thereafter the crew requested to return to Miami due to smoke in the cockpit. Flight 592 was vectored for a runway 12 approach. At 7207 feet, descending at 260 knots on a 210 heading, the FDR stopped recording. Fifty seconds later ValuJet 592 struck a swamp with the nose pitched down 75-80 and disintegrated. It was concluded that there had been a very intense fire in the middle of the forward cargo hold, which burned through the cabin floor at seat rows 5 and 6 on the left hand side. Investigations focus on a fire, possibly caused by oxygen generators carried in the cargo hold. The aircraft carried boxes containing 144 oxygen canisters and two MD-80 main wheel tires in the forward hold.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of the accident, resulting in a fire in the Class D cargo compartment from the actuation of one or more oxygen generators improperly carried as cargo, were: (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, identify, and track unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in Class D cargo compartments. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance program and responsibilities, including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and the failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance employees were aware of the carrier's no-carry hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training." (NTSB/AAR-97/06)
