Equipment Failure Rates - real data?

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+1 on not thinking this data will be useful.

You do not seem to have models or data for:
- what regs: bullet proof, exotic, bare compact octo knock off/cheap.
- fresh or salt
- rinsed on site, at home, not at all
- serviced how often, by whom, what procedure, tools
- Checked pre dive how carefully: "it was all still connected" vs "12 point inspection".
- What is life threatening?
* It bubbled oddly -> panic -> near death
* The cover and diaphragm fell off, but breathing with palm as diaphragm is standard contingency so not life threatening.

Plus tbone's better point that the number is really really small.

ETA: Which may raise why I/we carry independent systems, but they also help protect against environmental impacts or procedural failures. Plus the received wisdom / gut that redundancy in a hostile environment is a good thing with only modest cost. And the failure cost may be fatal. And some, as I, operate solo.
 
Also transferred from the other thread:



Actually, given enough data, you absolutely can calculate the probabilities of any and all of what you describe. Each of these things you list (health, procedures, maintenance frequency, training, etc) are known as 'factors'. I do it all the time in our manufacturing environment where my factors include equipment failure and human data (such as recency of training, shift schedule, and sick/vacation days).

However, that not withstanding, I'm currently only interested in air-supply related equipment failure. I acknowledge there are a multitude of other factors, many worthy of investigation and understanding, and likely first-order (highly influential). I know my overall chances of a catastrophic emergency due to a screw up are much higher than an equipment failure. But that's not what I'm after right now.

Cheers!

G...

I'm a retired Industrial Accident Investigator...and yes...there are factors...lots of them...as well as ''root causes''...in this industry...most if not all can be ''controlled'' and even eliminated in some cases by following the factors as stated in my first post...

Unfortunately...this industry like all others...is adversely affected by ''human nature''...so we can only strive for perfection...sometimes getting within reach...but never quite there...

It's when we apply the ''good enough'' principle...that the perverbial s**t...hits the perverbial fan...

We have a member ''DandyDon'' who keeps us all abreast of scuba related accidents/incidents...he may be a good go-to source for stats/root causes...

Unfortunately in this industry ''accidents'' are not for the most part investigated by divers...and the lions share...especially fatalities are accounted for as ''drowning''...drowning in a lot of cases may be the end result...but usually not the root cause...something flooded...something leaked...something stopped working...something broke...someone became trapped...someone was attempting something for which they were not properly equipped/trained for...something caused the diver to panic...a lot of times we never find out...as the bodies are never recovered...

Finally for ''personal'' reasons...most near misses are kept to ones self...recorded in the mind as lesson learned...but never spoken aloud...

Best...Warren
 
I found another 70 shore O-Ring on the Piston Stem of a Ebay Scubapro MK-20 find.

It amazes me the equipment is as tolerant of faulty service as it is. I have had that screwed-up by a shop I had re-build a MK-20 when I had been out of the game for 15 years from a service perspective.

Soft o ring and backing bushing turned wrong. It free-flowed. I think their tech was a newbie. I should have checked the IP and he definitely should have. Would have caught it.

No names but it was the same regions center I took my service tech class back in 99.

I have since re-gained my lost knowledge with a vengeance and gone beyond.
 
@gr8jab
what we have learned from accident analysis is that there have been exceptionally few incidences of death due to equipment failure on open circuit scuba *maybe one a decade.....*

Is this BSAC data or another source?

@gr8jab
In terms of trying to quantify a probability of failure, the probability of failure is highest immediately after service, usually due to faulty parts from the manufacturer or bad service in the first place.

I'm assuming that designers/manufactures have extensively studied wear-out mechanism and chosen service intervals recommendations with huge safety margins. This post-service infant mortality was on my mind, but again don't know
where to get enough data to put into a model.

@gr8jab
It is functionally impossible to compile that data to get any sort of realistic data.

Although I think I could do something with less detail than you suggest, your point is still valid. The nature of the source of the data and how it is (not) reported limits the data set and skews what is reported.

@gr8jab
We can SWAG it fairly quickly.
...
that's 1/2.7m which is IMO irrelevant.

Although I respect this back-of-the-napkin guestimate, and acknowledge that the sheer order of magnitude alone makes the implied large confidence interval moot, I still wish there was better data.

TANGENT/RATHOLE WARNING: pony bottle efficacy

Let's say we generally trust a guestimate of 1/2.7m, and agree it is irrelevant to the overall OOA occurrence rate. Therefore what is the primary cause of OOA? Human error?

An individual can minimize human error through training, mindset, vigilance, planning. A logical conclusion that many here have espoused is that a pony bottle is a crutch for those who don't want to bother. I forget Tbone, are you in that camp? No judgement, just inquiry, all this is meant in 'conversational tone'.

So how does an individual honestly assess their own chances of making a mistake? We all know people on both ends of the spectrum, who are extremely over cautious or over confident. Measured introspection is difficult. Some divers may realize they are at risk and work to reduce that risk. Others may be unable to assess their own risk. Still others may over compensate by avoiding all but the most innocuous dives, or excessively train and plan well beyond the marginal utility thereof.

If we dismiss the pony bottle as a crutch for those unaware or unwilling to address their own inadequacies (chance of a human error induced OOA), are we not suffering from our own form of extremism? Are we really prepared to say "if you need a pony bottle, you obviously are deficient in some other area, and therefore should not dive until you can do so safely without a pony bottle."?

What that tends to create is an all-or-nothing paradigm, where if you are a diver, you must do it all the time, take every class you can, and constantly train and practice. If you can't, and you realize you don't have the time/money/interest to go all-in, and therefore realize you are at a higher risk of human error, you can't be a diver. That seems extreme to me.

So why isn't a pony bottle a good risk mitigation tool? Yes, we should be introspective enough to acknowledge our own shortcomings and attempt to correctly minimize them. But why can't a pony bottle be part of that mitigation plan?

Of course the problem is that the existence of the pony bottle may change the behavior of the diver, incurring additional risk that offsets or exceeds any mitigation by the bottle. This scenario, when applied to a diver without self awareness or enough introspection, is real and meaningful. But, I think to extrapolate this scenario to everyone who chooses a pony bottle is disingenuous and harmful to the aggregate risk of the diving community.

Many divers can self-evaluate and determine their risk for human error leading to OOA, and make a choice to mitigate the risk. Many divers are smart enough to mitigate by improving dive skills and vigilance. But for those unable to acceptably reduce the risk to personally tolerable levels, a pony bottle is a good addition.

Obviously, all this comes from my own struggles with risk. Since we've (above) determined that mechanical failure OOA is extremely rare, I have to consider my own chances of human error. Am I going to do something stupid? Have I done something stupid in the past? How will I react when faced with a stressful situation? Where is my own personal risk tolerance, and how can I move below that threshold?

Am I a moron? Let's hope that since I'm asking, I'm probably not. Therefore I can work to ensure I don't modify my diving behavior, and will not dismiss prudent training and practice. So, for me, pony bottle = less risk. I just hope my self-evaluation is reasonably accurate :)

But, sometimes I second guess that decision. Mostly when I look at the hassle of the pony bottle. It is one more piece of gear to maintain, transport (vacation diving), setup/teardown, and dangle from my gear. How much risk does it really mitigate? How likely am I to make a mistake? What dives won't I do without the bottle? Oh! Wait! I've already been here, feeling like I'm circling back on myself, with conflicting logic...

Boy am I frustrated with this struggle...
 
Boy am I frustrated with this struggle...
- Tiny sidemount
- Tiny independent or progressive equalization doubles

They force regular use of both independent systems. Or at least encourage it by regularly going OOA on your primary reg. Odds of both air systems failing is reasonably low. Assuming you don't abuse the redundancy.

All will be assimilated, particularly dive boats. :)

(Ahh..., to be clear, sidemount is not the simplest to deal with on land. But it's maybe more balanced/symmetrical than a pony.)
 
@gr8jab you can dig through the DAN incident reports and BSAC reports, but you'll be hard pressed to find what you're looking for.

You'd be surprised at how little true "engineering" has gone into the service intervals called out by the manufacturers. Sad but true, the intervals are far more frequent than they should be. There is accelerated wear testing they'll do where they can cycle a regulator for x-thousands of cycles to simulate some number of dives, but cycling regulators isn't what usually causes problems IME, it's FOD where stuff gets passed the filter, mars the pistons if salt/debris gets in an unsealed chamber, etc.

I agree with you that it'd be nice if we could actually get some sort of meaningful statistic, but the problem is the cost of the data against the savings of the result. So in this case it would be horrifically expensive to collect and analyse the data, and based off of the insignificant amount of information that can be gained from it, there is no ROI.

I do not use or advocate the use of pony bottles. I don't look down on those that use them and if it makes you feel better then by all means, go for it, but I believe it is an equipment solution to a skills problem for dives that don't require redundancy. I solo dive all the time on single cylinders and don't feel uncomfortable doing it. Granted from my AOW/Rescue class on I have trained in breathing from a reg without a diaphragm in, as well as bare tank breathing, and I've also had catastrophic first stage failure that resulted in complete loss of gas to the second stage while in a cave. If I feel the need to dive with any sort of redundant gas, I just use doubles or sidemount. Those are basically 3 scenarios. Any sort of overhead diving whether a physical overhead like a cave, or theoretical overhead like mandatory decompression *5-10 minutes of backgas deco doesn't count for me*. Any working dives where the dive MUST be completed. Diving with a FFM *usually also a working dive*, but if I'm diving a FFM there's a reason for it *usually comms*, and I need to stay on the mask if I can.
I have never felt the need for that level of redundancy when solo diving in recreational environments.
 
Is this BSAC data or another source?

It is not BSAC, I can point you at two deaths off the same boat on the same day due to badly maintained kit. And Martin Parker of AP gave two examples of people in the same club dying in near identical circumstances a year apart due to messing with stuff they did not understand or know how to test.

Outside of badly maintained kit I agree they are rare and it could be argued that badly maintained kit counts as a Darwin Award.
 
@KenGordon badly maintained or improperly serviced gear does not IMO count as equipment failure. Sure the equipment failed, but it was not in proper operating order prior to starting the dive which means to me that it's a Darwin award....
 
I've had one dive - where I vomited through the reg...twice, before I was up and on the surface. I suspect contaminated air in the cylinder. Was renting tanks in Kauai.

I've had one dive - where I didn't turn my tank valve all the way open. Very beginning of the dive, maybe 4 FSW. Felt like I was sucking through a straw, my buddy turned it open all the way - we continued our dive.

I've had two dives where my scubapro uwatec aladin and uwatec Smart Com just croaked. No data. Suddenly. So I signaled my buddy and we ended the dive. I knew I still had several hundred PSI in the cylinder, but it didn't matter. We went for coffee instead.

So - this is four mistakes/ errors that could have been bad. In 225 dives.
 
Have you contacted the NEDU for data? Years ago I listened to one of its members give a talk and he stated equipment failure underwater was very rare; operator era was by far much higher.
 

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