woody5248
New
I thought i would post this here as the flat earth society on RBW have banned this discussion. I feel we need to get a balance, so any RB divers out there that wish to contribute please do. Even better if you can add as a safety qualified engineer.
I am and all that is written is completely right generically.
Press Release: Functional Safety and Ambient Pressure Diving (APD) Ltd
News that Deep Lifes rebreather designs are meeting the requirements for both CE and full
Functional Safety certification is sending waves through the industry. Deep Life notes the
timing of some of the industry responses.
Deep Lifes Lead Technologist, Alex Deas, PhD, FIEE, C.Eng, is named in a press release,
dated 12th November, from Ambient Pressure Diving Ltd, a company making rebreathers.
There is no connection whatsoever between Dr Deas and either of the two other parties named,
other than they report to have suffered from faults Dr Deas pointed out in APD rebreathers and
spoke out independently regarding their experience.
As stated in the APD press release, Dr Deas has raised concerns about the safety of the APD
rebreathers. This was done first privately with APD then later publicly and in court.
Dr Deass concerns relate to the fact that over a period of 10 years, less than 3300 APD
Inspiration rebreathers were made, representing an average population of under 1650 in
existence, using which, 80 divers died. APD failed when they sued to have Dr. Deas gagged
on the basis that his published data on the number of units was so accurate that APD suggested
it used APD confidential data. Dr Deas provided evidence obtained that his data was obtained
by independent research. His data gives breakdowns of 2700 Inspiration rebreather sales by
year.
The sales figures for Inspiration rebreathers are not widely known and in some quarters much
higher figures have been suggested, with the effect of covering up the true level of risk.
Dr Deas has been called as an expert witness in two separate court cases implicating APD in
the deaths of divers using APD rebreathers. In both cases use of formal methods indicate the
most plausible cause is a Functional Safety failure. His evidence was based on technical
investigations of APD equipment which had established a number of specific faults with
mechanics, electronics and software which can result in death from hypoxia. A Senior UK
HSE expert confirmed in court in IOM that they had observed the Functional Safety fault on
the APD Inspiration rebreathers reported by Dr. Deas. Technical evidence is just one thread in
the fabric that may determine the outcome of a legal case, albeit an important one.
Dr Deass complaint against APD, referred to in the APD press release, relates specifically to
the lack of Functional Safety Certification for its products or processes, as laid down by EU
standard EN 61508. This complaint is not addressed in the recent press release from APD.
The certificates attached to the APD press release are a Certificate of Approval of the APD
Quality Management System to ISO 9001:2008, relating to quality management procedures
within the company, and Approval of Conformity Certificates relating to PPE Directive
89/686/EEC, as amended by Directives 93/68/EEC and 93/95/EEC, which covers primarily
mechanical aspects of personal protective equipment. They are not Functional Safety
Certificates certifying compliance with standard EN 61508, covering overall Functional
Safety, including electronic and software components of equipment and their interaction.
The Approval of Conformity certificates presented in the APD press release have been issued
by Lloyds Register, who are not competent to audit EN 61508. The only accredited EN 61508
auditors for this type of equipment or the processes that manage them are SIRA Certification
and a specialist division of TUV.
The examination by the HSE referred to the letter from Andrew Burnside of Cornwall
Council, is similarly not an examination for compliance with EN 61508: the HSE are not
accredited EN 61508 auditors though do have some EN 61508 experts who have testified in
court that serious functional safety issues have been reproduced by them. The Trading
Standards Authority have never been accredited EN 61508 auditors,
It has not been industry practice for safety certification bodies to apply the directives and
harmonised standards requiring EN 61508 for rebreather diving equipment, even though it is
stipulated through the relevant harmonised standard. Dr Deass complaint was intended to
challenge this failure to apply EU law in the area of rebreathers, because there is evidence this
failure is responsible for deaths of rebreather divers.
The press release by APD appears to be a continuation of a cover-up of serious safety issues
which has been on-going for more than decade. This cover-up involves many parties.
The cover up starts with the secrecy surrounding the sales figures for APD Inspiration
rebreathers. The fatal accident rate is almost unbelievable given the true sales figure. The
APD Inspiration was nicknamed the YBOD, for Yellow Box of Death within a couple of
years of its launch, even before Dr. Deas discovered some of the reasons why that title may be
appropriate.
As stated above, the press release by APD makes no mention of any Functional Safety
certificate, the lack of which is the substance of Dr Deass complaint. The press release tries
to sidetrack the issue by referring to CE certificates relating primarily to the mechanical
aspects of their products. APD rebreathers initially had mechanical problems resulting in
Work of Breathing non-compliance. By 2008, APD had incorporated changes to their
products to address this. However, the exclusions to EN 14143:2003 on page 2 of the APD CE
certificates suggest the hoses still do not comply with EN 14143:2003 even though APD were
involved in drafting the requirements for hoses in that standard. Nor do the products comply
with the hydrostatic imbalance requirement, despite an error in the 2003 standard heavily
favouring over-the-shoulder counterlungs that APD use.
Dr Deas has not made any significant complaints about these mechanical areas, as they
involve the two subsections in the standard that contain errors: the Hydrostatic Imbalance
limits in EN 14143:2003 Table 1 is incorrectly labelled Suprasternal Notch when the figures
are actually Lung Centroid numbers, and the requirement that the diver can reach the
mouthpiece is incorrectly stated as a maximum hose stretch.
The prime complaint is that there is no Functional Safety certificate, and no accredited body
has confirmed the Functional Safety of APDs products. An additional complaint is that
despite the proven existence of grave Functional Safety faults, there has been no recall of
equipment already sold to correct the most serious of these, even although the discovery of
these faults led to extensive changes in APD products sold after their discovery.
Dr. Deas made his initial complaint privately a decade ago, in 2000. His action in making this
a public issue after witnessing APDs inadequate response, has been compared to kicking a
hornets nest. The result prompted one commentator to ask if the criticisms have merely hit
too close to home (and the pocket book) of powerful people in the close knit sports diving
industry, that at times, seems incredibly resistant to change.
Page 3 of 5
The APD responses to the questions raised by Dr. Deas are extreme and similar to that of the
tobacco industry cover-up in the 1970s. APDs US lawyer has even created a web site to
slander Dr. Deas. It is reported that this is because APD are very afraid of his testimony as an
Expert Witness, aware that he wishes to demonstrate the issues live in court something that
has not been allowed so far.
The chronology of the scandal is summarised below.
Date Event
April
2000
Dr. Deas purchased two APD Buddy Inspiration rebreathers on which he and
Mark Reeves, his technical diving buddy, received training, including a tour of
the factory where the Inspiration rebreathers were being made.
May
2000
Within 50 hours of use, one Inspiration controller hung underwater mid-dive,
another jumped to random code, another reset underwater into a non-dive
mode. All of these are critical failures that are immediately life threatening.
Lab tests performed to find the reason why identified immediately a total lack
of Functional Safety design in these units: no working brown-out circuit, no
watchdog timer, no TTA architecture, mistakes in the dual redundancy,
meaning there was no controller redundancy, serious power supply faults and
software faults. Deas advised APD, provided the tests and test results, along
with detailed information to enable APD to correct these faults.
June
2000
APD proposed to release backlit handsets to address 8 of the 11 faults
identified by Deas. Concern was expressed by Deas that there no recall was
planned, and that these mandatory safety improvements were at an additional
cost for existing users so not all users would receive the corrections.
Deas advised APD that if they were not going to fix the three remaining
issues, Deas would develop a safe controller for his own use. At this point
Deas had no commercial interest in rebreathers. The absence of any
aggressive motives is attested by the fact that Deas even advised APD on the
restructure of their business to protect it from the inevitable legal cases from
these failings. APD implemented the measures suggested by Deas, dividing
their business into three in 2001.
Deas, a highly qualified electronics engineer and award-winning electronics
designer with extensive Functional Safety experience, went on to develop a
safe controller as he had advised APD. This was the starting point for
subsequent commercial development of rebreather products by Deep Life Ltd
in 2005.
June
2002
Other companies entered the rebreather market in response to widespread
awareness of some of the safety issues with the Inspiration Classic, which
were causing owners to look for an off-the-shelf solution such as the
Hammerhead controllers.
Dr. Deas discovered that the APD electronics and software was developed by
Nigel Hester, understood to be a salesman without any engineering training,
with Martin Parker acting as the Project Manager despite having had no
formal education after the age of 16 and no engineering training. This created
an environment where ignorance of Functional Safety allowed the APD
rebreather faults to develop.
June
2005
Deas, alarmed at the continuing cover-up of Functional Safety issues by APD
and rising death toll went public with some of the information. He decided to
Page 4 of 5
offer the safer technology he had developed commercially to any party and
founded Deep Life Ltd in order to do so. Deas was well aware from others
that if he spoke up about the APD issues, APD would use the tobacco industry
methods it used on others against himself, which would hurt his business:
there was commercial pressure to keep silent.
By April
2007
APD addressed the WOB problem by mouthpiece changes, but again no recall
was made. Concerned about the still rising death toll, Deas decided to support
court cases where Functional Safety failings were implicated, subject to no
component manufacturer being sued. APD made it clear they would sue
widows who took them to court, ultimately getting charges on homes, even
getting the allowances for a bereaved infant, despite these being less than the
legal costs this involves: APD made the point not to argue with them, some
other widows dropped their cases out of fear of being sued.
March
2008
A UK HSE Functional Safety expert reported to the IOM Coroner and testified
in a fatal accident case that they found what appeared to be a serious
Functional Safety fault with the APD Inspiration, after reviewing a complaint
by Deas that the HSE person who investigated the rebreathers initially
following fatal accidents was not competent to do so, as he had received no
Functional Safety training.
April
2008
Deas decided to develop a sports rebreather, fully complying with all
Functional Safety requirements, publish the data to promote good practice in
the industry, and licence the products to an APD competitor.
In a post to an internet diving forum, an authorative party unconnected with
Deas pointed out that, if successful, Deass action would finish companies
selling unsafe eCCRs unless they changed. APD commenced a virulent smear
campaign against Deas and this extended to anyone who had encountered the
problems Deas highlighted or spoke up about them. APDs US lawyer even
created a smear site to slander Deas. It became known that Deass advice was
to demonstrate the Functional Safety faults in open court; this was prevented
by lawyers, but APD are concerned that it will be done in the future.
March
2010
Deep Life received Functional Safety certification from SIRA for the entire
rebreather lifecycle process established by Deas, showing it can be done for
rebreathers. The EN 61508 safety certification even at the onerous level of
SIL 3 was achieved faster and at less cost than obtaining PPE certificates
which currently provide far less safety rigour or coverage of rebreathers. This
EN 61508 route withstood audit checks after a 3rd party named on the APD
press release formally challenged it with SIRA: questions about certifications
are a proper cost of living in a democracy.
There has been considerable support for Deass actions, despite a cabal seeking to cover up or
discredit his actions. Some people can be bought or bullied, some cannot, and Deas is of the
latter camp, as are many other staff in Deep Life Ltd. Deep Life is grateful for the support of
divers who contact the company to support Deass exposure of safety cover-ups, many
relating their own experiences.
Deep Life would like the existing EN 14143:2003 standard to remain in force, but with the
two items that are known to be errors corrected, so that at least in Europe rebreathers are
required to have a minimum of Functional Safety to protect the end user. Deep Life is
opposed to moves to evade Functional Safety requirements either by removing the references
in EN 14143 to EN 61508, or even worse, by removing EN 61508 compliance requirements
but creating an illusion by inserting extracts from EN 61508 into EN 14143 which would have
the effect of removing competent Functional Safety auditors from the assessment loop.
The application of Functional Safety within the dive industry is a major step forward. The
size of the step can be judged by the size of the waves it is creating. This is what a paradigm
shift looks like in an industry.
I am and all that is written is completely right generically.
Press Release: Functional Safety and Ambient Pressure Diving (APD) Ltd
News that Deep Lifes rebreather designs are meeting the requirements for both CE and full
Functional Safety certification is sending waves through the industry. Deep Life notes the
timing of some of the industry responses.
Deep Lifes Lead Technologist, Alex Deas, PhD, FIEE, C.Eng, is named in a press release,
dated 12th November, from Ambient Pressure Diving Ltd, a company making rebreathers.
There is no connection whatsoever between Dr Deas and either of the two other parties named,
other than they report to have suffered from faults Dr Deas pointed out in APD rebreathers and
spoke out independently regarding their experience.
As stated in the APD press release, Dr Deas has raised concerns about the safety of the APD
rebreathers. This was done first privately with APD then later publicly and in court.
Dr Deass concerns relate to the fact that over a period of 10 years, less than 3300 APD
Inspiration rebreathers were made, representing an average population of under 1650 in
existence, using which, 80 divers died. APD failed when they sued to have Dr. Deas gagged
on the basis that his published data on the number of units was so accurate that APD suggested
it used APD confidential data. Dr Deas provided evidence obtained that his data was obtained
by independent research. His data gives breakdowns of 2700 Inspiration rebreather sales by
year.
The sales figures for Inspiration rebreathers are not widely known and in some quarters much
higher figures have been suggested, with the effect of covering up the true level of risk.
Dr Deas has been called as an expert witness in two separate court cases implicating APD in
the deaths of divers using APD rebreathers. In both cases use of formal methods indicate the
most plausible cause is a Functional Safety failure. His evidence was based on technical
investigations of APD equipment which had established a number of specific faults with
mechanics, electronics and software which can result in death from hypoxia. A Senior UK
HSE expert confirmed in court in IOM that they had observed the Functional Safety fault on
the APD Inspiration rebreathers reported by Dr. Deas. Technical evidence is just one thread in
the fabric that may determine the outcome of a legal case, albeit an important one.
Dr Deass complaint against APD, referred to in the APD press release, relates specifically to
the lack of Functional Safety Certification for its products or processes, as laid down by EU
standard EN 61508. This complaint is not addressed in the recent press release from APD.
The certificates attached to the APD press release are a Certificate of Approval of the APD
Quality Management System to ISO 9001:2008, relating to quality management procedures
within the company, and Approval of Conformity Certificates relating to PPE Directive
89/686/EEC, as amended by Directives 93/68/EEC and 93/95/EEC, which covers primarily
mechanical aspects of personal protective equipment. They are not Functional Safety
Certificates certifying compliance with standard EN 61508, covering overall Functional
Safety, including electronic and software components of equipment and their interaction.
The Approval of Conformity certificates presented in the APD press release have been issued
by Lloyds Register, who are not competent to audit EN 61508. The only accredited EN 61508
auditors for this type of equipment or the processes that manage them are SIRA Certification
and a specialist division of TUV.
The examination by the HSE referred to the letter from Andrew Burnside of Cornwall
Council, is similarly not an examination for compliance with EN 61508: the HSE are not
accredited EN 61508 auditors though do have some EN 61508 experts who have testified in
court that serious functional safety issues have been reproduced by them. The Trading
Standards Authority have never been accredited EN 61508 auditors,
It has not been industry practice for safety certification bodies to apply the directives and
harmonised standards requiring EN 61508 for rebreather diving equipment, even though it is
stipulated through the relevant harmonised standard. Dr Deass complaint was intended to
challenge this failure to apply EU law in the area of rebreathers, because there is evidence this
failure is responsible for deaths of rebreather divers.
The press release by APD appears to be a continuation of a cover-up of serious safety issues
which has been on-going for more than decade. This cover-up involves many parties.
The cover up starts with the secrecy surrounding the sales figures for APD Inspiration
rebreathers. The fatal accident rate is almost unbelievable given the true sales figure. The
APD Inspiration was nicknamed the YBOD, for Yellow Box of Death within a couple of
years of its launch, even before Dr. Deas discovered some of the reasons why that title may be
appropriate.
As stated above, the press release by APD makes no mention of any Functional Safety
certificate, the lack of which is the substance of Dr Deass complaint. The press release tries
to sidetrack the issue by referring to CE certificates relating primarily to the mechanical
aspects of their products. APD rebreathers initially had mechanical problems resulting in
Work of Breathing non-compliance. By 2008, APD had incorporated changes to their
products to address this. However, the exclusions to EN 14143:2003 on page 2 of the APD CE
certificates suggest the hoses still do not comply with EN 14143:2003 even though APD were
involved in drafting the requirements for hoses in that standard. Nor do the products comply
with the hydrostatic imbalance requirement, despite an error in the 2003 standard heavily
favouring over-the-shoulder counterlungs that APD use.
Dr Deas has not made any significant complaints about these mechanical areas, as they
involve the two subsections in the standard that contain errors: the Hydrostatic Imbalance
limits in EN 14143:2003 Table 1 is incorrectly labelled Suprasternal Notch when the figures
are actually Lung Centroid numbers, and the requirement that the diver can reach the
mouthpiece is incorrectly stated as a maximum hose stretch.
The prime complaint is that there is no Functional Safety certificate, and no accredited body
has confirmed the Functional Safety of APDs products. An additional complaint is that
despite the proven existence of grave Functional Safety faults, there has been no recall of
equipment already sold to correct the most serious of these, even although the discovery of
these faults led to extensive changes in APD products sold after their discovery.
Dr. Deas made his initial complaint privately a decade ago, in 2000. His action in making this
a public issue after witnessing APDs inadequate response, has been compared to kicking a
hornets nest. The result prompted one commentator to ask if the criticisms have merely hit
too close to home (and the pocket book) of powerful people in the close knit sports diving
industry, that at times, seems incredibly resistant to change.
Page 3 of 5
The APD responses to the questions raised by Dr. Deas are extreme and similar to that of the
tobacco industry cover-up in the 1970s. APDs US lawyer has even created a web site to
slander Dr. Deas. It is reported that this is because APD are very afraid of his testimony as an
Expert Witness, aware that he wishes to demonstrate the issues live in court something that
has not been allowed so far.
The chronology of the scandal is summarised below.
Date Event
April
2000
Dr. Deas purchased two APD Buddy Inspiration rebreathers on which he and
Mark Reeves, his technical diving buddy, received training, including a tour of
the factory where the Inspiration rebreathers were being made.
May
2000
Within 50 hours of use, one Inspiration controller hung underwater mid-dive,
another jumped to random code, another reset underwater into a non-dive
mode. All of these are critical failures that are immediately life threatening.
Lab tests performed to find the reason why identified immediately a total lack
of Functional Safety design in these units: no working brown-out circuit, no
watchdog timer, no TTA architecture, mistakes in the dual redundancy,
meaning there was no controller redundancy, serious power supply faults and
software faults. Deas advised APD, provided the tests and test results, along
with detailed information to enable APD to correct these faults.
June
2000
APD proposed to release backlit handsets to address 8 of the 11 faults
identified by Deas. Concern was expressed by Deas that there no recall was
planned, and that these mandatory safety improvements were at an additional
cost for existing users so not all users would receive the corrections.
Deas advised APD that if they were not going to fix the three remaining
issues, Deas would develop a safe controller for his own use. At this point
Deas had no commercial interest in rebreathers. The absence of any
aggressive motives is attested by the fact that Deas even advised APD on the
restructure of their business to protect it from the inevitable legal cases from
these failings. APD implemented the measures suggested by Deas, dividing
their business into three in 2001.
Deas, a highly qualified electronics engineer and award-winning electronics
designer with extensive Functional Safety experience, went on to develop a
safe controller as he had advised APD. This was the starting point for
subsequent commercial development of rebreather products by Deep Life Ltd
in 2005.
June
2002
Other companies entered the rebreather market in response to widespread
awareness of some of the safety issues with the Inspiration Classic, which
were causing owners to look for an off-the-shelf solution such as the
Hammerhead controllers.
Dr. Deas discovered that the APD electronics and software was developed by
Nigel Hester, understood to be a salesman without any engineering training,
with Martin Parker acting as the Project Manager despite having had no
formal education after the age of 16 and no engineering training. This created
an environment where ignorance of Functional Safety allowed the APD
rebreather faults to develop.
June
2005
Deas, alarmed at the continuing cover-up of Functional Safety issues by APD
and rising death toll went public with some of the information. He decided to
Page 4 of 5
offer the safer technology he had developed commercially to any party and
founded Deep Life Ltd in order to do so. Deas was well aware from others
that if he spoke up about the APD issues, APD would use the tobacco industry
methods it used on others against himself, which would hurt his business:
there was commercial pressure to keep silent.
By April
2007
APD addressed the WOB problem by mouthpiece changes, but again no recall
was made. Concerned about the still rising death toll, Deas decided to support
court cases where Functional Safety failings were implicated, subject to no
component manufacturer being sued. APD made it clear they would sue
widows who took them to court, ultimately getting charges on homes, even
getting the allowances for a bereaved infant, despite these being less than the
legal costs this involves: APD made the point not to argue with them, some
other widows dropped their cases out of fear of being sued.
March
2008
A UK HSE Functional Safety expert reported to the IOM Coroner and testified
in a fatal accident case that they found what appeared to be a serious
Functional Safety fault with the APD Inspiration, after reviewing a complaint
by Deas that the HSE person who investigated the rebreathers initially
following fatal accidents was not competent to do so, as he had received no
Functional Safety training.
April
2008
Deas decided to develop a sports rebreather, fully complying with all
Functional Safety requirements, publish the data to promote good practice in
the industry, and licence the products to an APD competitor.
In a post to an internet diving forum, an authorative party unconnected with
Deas pointed out that, if successful, Deass action would finish companies
selling unsafe eCCRs unless they changed. APD commenced a virulent smear
campaign against Deas and this extended to anyone who had encountered the
problems Deas highlighted or spoke up about them. APDs US lawyer even
created a smear site to slander Deas. It became known that Deass advice was
to demonstrate the Functional Safety faults in open court; this was prevented
by lawyers, but APD are concerned that it will be done in the future.
March
2010
Deep Life received Functional Safety certification from SIRA for the entire
rebreather lifecycle process established by Deas, showing it can be done for
rebreathers. The EN 61508 safety certification even at the onerous level of
SIL 3 was achieved faster and at less cost than obtaining PPE certificates
which currently provide far less safety rigour or coverage of rebreathers. This
EN 61508 route withstood audit checks after a 3rd party named on the APD
press release formally challenged it with SIRA: questions about certifications
are a proper cost of living in a democracy.
There has been considerable support for Deass actions, despite a cabal seeking to cover up or
discredit his actions. Some people can be bought or bullied, some cannot, and Deas is of the
latter camp, as are many other staff in Deep Life Ltd. Deep Life is grateful for the support of
divers who contact the company to support Deass exposure of safety cover-ups, many
relating their own experiences.
Deep Life would like the existing EN 14143:2003 standard to remain in force, but with the
two items that are known to be errors corrected, so that at least in Europe rebreathers are
required to have a minimum of Functional Safety to protect the end user. Deep Life is
opposed to moves to evade Functional Safety requirements either by removing the references
in EN 14143 to EN 61508, or even worse, by removing EN 61508 compliance requirements
but creating an illusion by inserting extracts from EN 61508 into EN 14143 which would have
the effect of removing competent Functional Safety auditors from the assessment loop.
The application of Functional Safety within the dive industry is a major step forward. The
size of the step can be judged by the size of the waves it is creating. This is what a paradigm
shift looks like in an industry.
